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1. Introduction 
The diminishing role of ideology and the increasing focus on economic growth after 
Deng Xiaoping came to power resulted in an increasing pressure on the Chinese 
government to maintain economic growth rates in order to keep its legitimacy. Ever 
since the shift of focus to the production of relatively low value added, low tech 
consumption articles destined for Western markets in the 1980 the demand for energy, 
especially oil, of the Chinese economy has continuously risen. (Daojiong, Z. 2005). 
 Resource seeking and in particular natural resource seeking, has been one of 
the key strategic considerations for China’s outward foreign direct investment.(Hong 
and Sun 2006) State planners have identified oil as one of the most important strategic 
resources that must be secured. The government’s efforts in this area involve the 
creation and the subsequent going out of the Chinese National Oil Corporations 
(NOC) as the earliest Chinese commercial actors to venture abroad. (Norris 2010) 
Because China lacks the military capability to provide Beijing with the assurance of 
continued access to resources and oil in particular, the nation’s political leaders and 
strategic planners are navigating through a period where: “Their ability to maintain 
domestic growth and social stability will be hostage to external events and, perhaps, 
to the forbearance of those they regard as potential foes.”(Friedberg 2006:7)  
In international relations thinking on Chinese oil diplomacy, the dominant 
theory is the realist perspective that China’s oil diplomacy exhibits mercantilism. 
Realists belong to the so-called Beijing as puppeteer camp, and claim that the state not 
only has prime interests in securing foreign raw materials but is also capable of using 
its enterprises to fulfill those interests, even in the face of domestic resistance. In this 
State focused perception of Chinese oil diplomacy the Chinese NOCs are an extension 
and integrate part of Chinese foreign policy. International actions of NOCs serve the 
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Chinese development goals established by the central state and can all be explained in 
the light of the Chinese grand strategy. (Holslag 2006; Lee 2010) 
 
In contrast to the realist perspective, liberal and institutionalist approaches to China’s 
oil diplomacy however do not consider the Chinese state to be an entirely independent 
autonomous actor in complete control over the international actions and investments 
of NOC’s. Instead, foreign policy formation including oil diplomacy as well as the 
international actions and investments of oil corporations are viewed upon as relatively 
independent. (Shaofeng 2008; Downs 2004; Daojiong 2006 ) 
The possible discrepancy between the interests of China’s NOCs and those of the 
Chinese central state is the main focal point of this thesis. I will explore how the 
Chinese government attempts to use economic statecraft in the context of its strategic 
resource security goals. While the Chinese government in the light of its energy grand 
strategy uses economic statecraft to satisfy China’s increasing thirst for oil (Goldstein 
A. 2005), some authors point out that a side effect of “going out strategy” for Chinese 
NOCs is that the Chinese state has had to compromise on its goal to maintain control 
over its internationally competitive corporations. (Houser 2008; Loui 2009; Jiang, J., 
& Sinton,J. 2011). Due to the company reforms and bureaucratic reorganization 
necessary to make NOCs internationally competitive, NOC’s have acquired enough 
autonomy to run a company foreign investment policy that is different from, or maybe 
even conflicting with, the central governments Grand Strategy considering resource 
security.(Norris, W. 2010; Jiang, W. 2009; Chen, S. 2008; Horváth, A. 2011)   
This thesis aims to shed light on China’s efforts to utilize economic statecraft 
as part of its resource grand strategy and the conditions that determine its success or 
failure. A comparative research of Chinese economic statecraft in Brazil and Angola 
will be part of it.  
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The central question of this thesis is: Under what conditions does the Chinese 
state succeed or fail to control, direct or otherwise use national oil companies in 
pursuit of its strategic goals? 
 
This thesis consists of three parts, the three chapters of the first part set out the topic. 
After the introduction of chapter one, the driving forces of Chinese oil grand strategy 
will be defined in chapter 2. I will go over the main goals it sets out to achieve and 
how the Chinese state resorts to economic statecraft in pursuit of these goals. Chapter 
three is a literature review, describing the two paradoxes China faces as a 
consequence of the “going out” of its oil companies. In the first paradox state 
centralism is set against market domination, the second paradox describes how 
China’s strict government control faces increasing levels of NOC autonomy.  
The second, methodological part of the thesis consists of three chapters. In 
chapter four I will introduce the theoretical framework used to approach the problem. 
I will clarify the methodological choice to take domestic and international conditions 
into account explaining the success or failure of Chinese economic statecraft. Chapter 
five shall explain how the theoretical framework is applied and explains the concepts 
and measurements. Chapter six contains the case selection and hypotheses.  
In the four chapters of the third part, there is a further subdivision to be made 
between the chapters with a domestic and an international focus. Chapter seven, the 
international dimension shall pass the review, by explaining the strategic goals of 
China’s economic statecraft and the pathway through which these goals are to be 
achieved. Chapter eight and nine also have a international dimension and focus on 
Angola’s and Brazil’s domestic level. Investigating the extent to which target state 
institutional conditions are explanatory variables for the success or failure of 
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economic statecraft. Chapter ten, has a sending state domestic focus. It investigates 
what influence state institutional conditions have on the relationship between the 
Chinese government and the NOCs and what impact this has on the government’s 
ability to control, direct or otherwise use national oil companies in pursuit of its 
strategic goals. The concluding chapter, chapter eleven, will present the main findings.  
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2. Chinese economic statecraft and oil grand strategy  
According to Friedberg China’s turn to the market has resulted in the loss of Marxist 
ideology as a legitimization of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) power, instead 
China’s leadership is now legitimized by the gradually but constantly improving 
living conditions of Chinese society. (Friedberg, A. L. 2006). This makes maintaining 
economic growth levels a primary target of the regime. The necessity to maintain 
economic growth levels, but more importantly because China’s most powerful 
instruments to exert influence in the international arena are economic, economic 
statecraft plays an increasingly important role in Chinese grand strategy. Economic 
statecraft can be defined as: “the use of economic instruments by a government to 
influence the behavior of another state.” (Alves, A. C. 2011; 28) (Blanchard 2011; 
Chen, J. 1995; Norris 2010; Friedberg, A. L. 2006) 
As a typical developing country, the core of China’s economic system is 
manufacturing and processing industry. China has emerged as the Worlds 
manufacturing center but the large scale production and transportation of these goods 
requires a lot of energy. Since 1993, China’s domestic oil production is insufficient to 
meet the still growing demand of its industry resulting in China becoming one of the 
largest oil importing countries in the world. Of the natural resources and raw materials 
needed to sustain rapid economic growth in its manufacturing and industrial sectors, 
oil is by far the most important critical resource needed to fulfill its energy needs. 
(Sheng 2008(a); Daojiong, Z. 2006) 
As an irreplaceable strategic resource oil has been in short supply, therefore 
obtaining energy security and especially access to oil resources plays an important 
part in China’s foreign strategy. “Energy security has become a big concern in China. 
In order to enhance its energy security, the government tries hard to bolster its 
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national oil companies (NOCs) foreign energy quest”.(2.Shaofeng pg600) (Burgos 
Caceres, S., & Ear, S. 2012; Yilin Jiang & Shihua Lui) 
Like all forms of statecraft, economic statecraft applies to national instruments 
of power as means to influence political outcomes. Unlike other forms of statecraft, 
the means are economic. These means flow from the premise that asymmetric trade 
relationships have political consequences. Or as Hirshman says: “a country trying to 
make the most of its strategic position of its own trade will try precisely to create the 
conditions that make the interruption of trade of much graver concern to its trading 
partners than to itself.”(Hirschman, A. O. 1945; 16) It is the encouragement of certain 
types of economic interaction that creates externalities that are conductive to a States 
strategic interest, as such economic statecraft can be seen as the economic component 
of China’s grand strategy. (Norris 2010 pg13)The concept of externalities captures the 
notion that a given transaction may also produce effects that are not fully internalized 
by the parties that are directly conducting the transaction. Economic statecraft is the 
state manipulation of economic interaction in order to capitalize on, or reduce the 
associated security externalities. States can pursue strategies that seek to manipulate 
these externalities by structuring the incentives of the commercial actors involved. 
(Norris 2010) 
Pursuing these externalities involves the exercise of economic levers in pursuit 
of political objectives that do not necessarily have to be economic. Coercive levers are 
punitive measures like sanctions, embargos, tariffs and financial measures applied or 
threatened in the context of bilateral asymmetric interdependence. Non-coercive 
methods of economic statecraft strive to develop influence effects through application 
of levers that function as economic inducements, luring the target state towards the 
sending states desired political outcomes. (Kastner, S.L. 2010) 
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The primary policy goal of China’s economic statecraft in oil producing 
countries is to achieve the acquisition of sufficient energy supplies to maintain 
economic growth and protect the leaders core interests. The Chinese government’s 
main objective is to ensure adequate import of oil to maintain Chinese economic 
growth while simultaneously diversifying their sources of supply. This policy is based 
on the desire to circumvent an over-reliance on the global oil market through either 
actually acquiring major stakes in foreign oilfields or safeguarding access. Another 
reason to diversify their sources of supply is to decrease the strategic importance of 
the Malacca strait as the only alley through which oil flows to China. (Tailor, I 2006) 
China thus defines energy security in terms of two issues: price volatility and 
security of delivery. This makes securing long term supply contracts and accessing 
exploration rights the two core objectives of Chinese oil grand strategy. China aims at 
achieving these goals through the exercise of economic levers. “Its strategy is to 
acquire assets and exert political influence in the recipient markets. ‘When the 
Chinese make a decision to start-up a strategic relationship, there are obviously going 
to be strategic implications.” (Alden,C. 2006:88) 
 
Chinese NOC’s and the energy bureaucracy 
China’s NOCs are a useful tool for Chinese leadership to exert economic leverage. 
There are three major Chinese NOC’s: China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation 
(Sinopec), China’s National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), and China’s 
National Petroleum Corporation (CPNC). Born out China’s economic system reforms 
in the 1980s, when the Chinese government decided to convert productive assets of 
ministries into state-owned enterprises, these three corporations share a common set 
of parents in the former Ministry of Petroleum Industry and the former Ministry of 
Chemical industry.  (Jiang, J., & Sinton, J. 2011) 
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As a result of China’s economic reforms the past three decades Chinese 
NOC’s are a group of enterprises that are uniquely intertwined in China’s bureaucracy. 
In the Chinese government’s bureaucratic ranking system, both CNPC and Sinopec 
are at ministry level, the same as State Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC). The chairman and CEO’s of NOCs, who also hold vice-
ministerial ranks, are appointed by the Organization Department of the Communist 
party of China. The top executives of the NOCs are deeply connected to the top 
leadership of the government and the CCP; they must wear two hats, as leaders of 
major commercial enterprises and as top Party operatives. (Jiang, J., & Sinton, J. 
2011) 
The organizational department of the CCP also appoints and trains the top 
executives of the SASAC, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Ministry of Finance 
(MOF), the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the National 
Energy Administration (NEA) and the China Regulatory Banking Commission 
(CRBC). The power of the agencies concerned with China’s NOCs is distributed from 
the top but also flows the other way around, Ministers in the higher echelons in the 
Communist Party of China frequently originate from a top position of an NOC.  
(Jiang, J., & Sinton, J. 2011)       
SASAC, is appointed by the Chinese state to supervise and manage the 
state‐owned enterprises and enhance the management of the state‐owned assets that 
fall under 123 large SOEs. As such it is formally the owner of China’s national-level 
state-invested firms. However, the power of SASAC to control the behavior of SOEs 
and how much it actually exercises the rights of ownership are open to debate. (Jiang, 
J., & Sinton, J. 2011) 
NOC’s pay dividends to the Ministry of Finance and get diplomatic support 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The National Development and Reform 
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Commission has price setting power for petrol on the domestic market and the 
National Energy Administration has an advisory role. The NDRC and the NEA hold 
powers of approval over investment projects. Thus cultivating and maintaining good 
relations with them is beneficial to the NOC’s. (Jiang, J., & Sinton, J. 2011) 
 
 
(Jiang, J., & Sinton, J. 2011: 25) 
 
Banks as instruments of Chinese economic statecraft 
As depicted above Chinese banks can form strategic alliances with NOCs, these 
alliances mainly occur when NOCs venture abroad. Via the CBRC China’s banks are 
under direct control of the State Council as such banks are a second important 
instrument of Chinese leadership to exert economic influence, not only on target states 
but can also be used to steer China’s own NOCs.  
China does not have a record of making use of negative economic statecraft 
but does frequently make use of economic inducements in pursuing its foreign policy 
 12 
goals. The EXIM bank’s is most known for the oil for loans structure, loans are also 
provided by other state banks the CDB and the ICBC. The main difference is that only 
the EXIM bank can extend concessional loans with low interest rates due to the 
subsidy by China’s ministry of commerce. CDB and ICBC offer exclusively market–
based interest rates. However most of the EXIM banks oil-backed loans are also 
extended on a more commercial basis. Loans between the branches of the Chinese 
government, from the state-owned banks to state-owned companies rarely happen 
Credit is primarily extended to governments and companies abroad. (Gallagher, K. P., 
Koleski, K., & Irwin, A. 2012 ) 
 
The Export Import bank 
The Export-Import (EXIM) bank is responsible for the financial management of 
projects involving concessional loans. EXIM bank concessional loans are primarily 
embarked for infrastructure construction. The EXIM bank is fully owned by the 
Chinese government and controlled by the State Council It acts as a key channel of 
policy promoting foreign trade and economic cooperation. It finances the Chinese 
import and export and tin undertaking offshore construction contracts and overseas 
investment projects by Chinese companies. (http://English.eximbank.gov.cn) 
The embassies and consulates are responsible for local coordination and 
management of projects in the receiving country. The whole process is monitored by 
the state council and the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
that play a strategic role in in policy making on Chinese foreign investments. In 2008 
a so-called inter-agency coordinating mechanism was established for the consultation 
between the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) the Ministry Of Finance and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on drafting and funding foreign aid programs. 
(news.xinhuanet website) 
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China Development Bank 
A similar but slightly different type of loan is extended by the China Development 
Bank (CDB). The CDB is a bank created in 1994 aiming at the providing financial 
support for China’s macro-economic development strategies. It is under the direct 
jurisdiction of the state council and provides long term financing for key projects in 
infrastructure as well as the financial support for the development of pillar industries 
vital to the development of the national economy. (CDB website) 
What makes these loans different from the concessional loans is firstly, that 
the borrower is an NOC rather that a national government. And secondly, that the 
loans are extended in more commercial terms and do not necessarily have to be repaid 
in kind. Although the credit is calculated based on the amount of oil the borrower can 
provide. The loans of the CDB are just as the concessional loan, highly synchronized 
with the relevance to China’s security strategy. (Gallagher, K. P., Koleski, K., & Irwin, 
A. 2012)  
 
Industrial and Commercial bank of China 
The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) was one of the four specialized 
state-owned banks that saw the light of day after the reformation of China’s mono-
bank system (Peoples Bank of China). (Lin, X., & Zhang, Y. 2009) 
When in the wake of the global economic crisis and after EXIM Bank had already 
provided a substantial amount of credit, Angola found itself again in dire straits ICBC 
provided a US$2.5bn dollar loan on the same terms as those extended by the EXIM 
bank, directed at infrastructure development and to be repaid in oil. (Alves, A. C. 
2011)In Brazil in mid-2010, ICBC international, a wholly-owned investment banking 
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subsidiary of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited, had been 
appointed by the Brazilians as one of the book-runners for Brazil based Petrobras 
IPO. (Santiso, J. 2010) 
 
China International Fund 
A fourth large Chinese credit line that provides financial services to oil rich countries, 
primarily to Angola, is the China International Fund (CIF). Credits are channeled 
through a private Chinese fund based in Hong Kong which came into existence 
through personal connections linking Hong Kong-based tycoons (some allegedly 
former State Owned Enterprise (SOE) senior cadres and others with links to Chinese 
intelligence), and NOC cadres. CIF was set up to fund projects under the Angolan 
National Reconstruction Office (Gabinete de Reconstrução Nacional, GRN).  
Despite the fact that CIF is privately owned. The loans it extends are 
contracted in the same terms as those of the EXIM bank, directed to infrastructure, 
tied to Chinese contractors and to be repaid in oil. However, because CIF is not a state 
organization and the Chinese its credit extension is to smaller extent steered by the 
Chinese government, I consider its loans not to be part of the golden triangle. (Alves, 
A. C. 2011) 
 
“Golden triangle” 
The executives of the state banks mentioned above work closely with Chinese oil 
corporates in putting together financial deals at preferable subsidized interest rates. As 
state driven institutions they have vast resources at their disposal and are able to 
provide discounted loans to Chinese corporations or foreign governments and NOCs, 
not necessarily subject to the same rigorous accountability and transparency 
constrains that govern western business ventures. The loans to foreign governments 
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and NOCs are provided on the condition that Chinese subcontractors are hired to 
execute the infrastructural work. ( Lin, X., & Zhang, Y. 2009) 
This “golden triangle” between Chinese companies, the state and quasi-
commercial lending institutions provides Chinese oil companies with the cheap 
finance to undercut their Western competitors and the Chinese state with an effective 
instrument to pursue its resource security goals abroad. The China Development 
Bank, for example, is the largest quasi-commercial bank in the world. With assets of 
US$350 billion, it is bigger than the World Bank and the Asia Bank. The China Exim-
Bank is the world’s third largest export credit agency – its principal mandate being to 
“implement state policies in industry, foreign trade and economy, finance and foreign 
affairs”. (Executive research associates (Pty) Ltd 2009: 77) 
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3. Paradoxes of Chinese NOC foreign direct investment 
In Chapter two, it was shown that various agencies are concerned with regulating 
different aspects of the NOCs activities often working at cross purposes. Both the 
government, the banks and the NOC’s have an interest in successful NOC investments 
abroad. The governments oil for loans strategy however apparently does not always 
result in obtainment of China’s strategic goals on energy security.  
Concerning NOC investments there is tension between the government and the 
NOC on two levels. This tension is best described by two paradoxes, the state 
centralism versus market domination paradox on the one hand and the NOC 
autonomy versus government control paradox on the other. (Jiang, J., & Sinton, J. 
2011) Having defined the Chinese governments energy security goals, the nature of 
the golden triangle and the structure of the Chinese energy bureaucracy, in this chapter 
the two paradoxes with different perceptions of the relations between the government 
and the NOC’s, will pass the review. 
 
In the Chinese perception, the combination of a general mistrust of global energy 
markets dominated by sophisticated global oil companies, Western industrial 
countries, unreliable and unstable-oil exporting countries dominated by the United 
states and China’s lacking domestic energy sector capabilities combine to give a 
mercantilist character to China’s energy security drive and to Beijing’s rhetoric about 
its energy security concerns. Chinese oil grand strategy is characterized by a realist 
outlook on world politics. It operates from the core assumption that World politics 
unfolds in an international anarchy in which states are perceived as the most important 
actors on the World stage. Or as Lieberthal and Herberg claim: “The mercantilist cast 
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of the go-out strategy reflects China’s sense of weakness and vulnerability regarding 
reliable access to energy supplies. This sense of weakness provides the rationale for 
direct state intervention and support.” (Lieberthal and Herberg 2005-
2006:15)(Blanchard, J. M. F. 2011; Burgos Caceres, S., & Ear, S. 2012; Jiang, Sun, 
Liu, 2010) 
Hui-Chi Yeh and Chi-Wei Yu investigated the extent to which Chinese foreign 
policy considering oil security is formulated to suffice mercantilist goals. They 
examined the contracts made by the state owned China national petroleum corporation 
(CNPC), the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), and the China 
Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (CPCC) with energy rich nations from 1993 to 
2008, and analyzed the relationships between both public and private sectors. Their 
findings were that the energy security policies of the government are key variables 
and the foundation of NOC’s foreign investment decisions. China’s energy diplomacy 
is mercantilist in nature because of the weakness of its NOC’s on the international 
market. Their main conclusion is that: “With the precondition of China’s political 
system and its energy companies lagged development in the international market, 
mercantilism inevitably became the main approach of Chinese energy diplomacy.”  
(Yeh, H. C., & Yu, C. W. 2012: 314) 
Dan Blumenthal goes a step further and as a true realist he predicts that: “If 
China continues to tend toward the energy-mercantilist side of the energy policy 
spectrum, as compared to solely relying on the open market ten the Public Liberation 
Army (PLA) will increase in importance to Beijing’s energy strategy” (Blumenthal, D. 
2008: 431). 
This vision on NOC investment falls within the broader school of thought on 
Chinese FDI also known as the “Beijing as puppeteer camp”. It argues that the 
selection of FDI location and sector is not simply determined by enterprises according 
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to market considerations. They point out that the biggest sources of outward FDI were 
highly profitable listed SOE’s, that NOC directors and executives are appointed by 
members of the Chinese Communist Party, and highlight the many instances where 
Beijing has overruled NOC corporate decision making. Chinese NOC’s are seen as an 
extension of the Chinese government and just an instrument by which the Chinese 
government can realize its foreign policy goals. They stress the correlation between 
Beijing’s priorities and the geographic and sectorial distribution of outward FDI. 
(Blanchard, J. M. F. 2011(b)) 
 
NOC goals 
However there is also a large body of literature focusing on NOCs company 
investment policy, that emphasizes how its FDI is increasingly guided by a 
commercial logic and has market oriented focus instead. Also known as the business 
is business camp, Keefer Douglas, Nelson and Schwartz, assessed China’s energy 
grand strategy and reject the view that China can successfully pursue a “neo-
mercantilist“ strategy of securing oil reserves. (Douglas, J. K., Nelson, M. B., & 
Schwartz, K. 2006) 
Jang and Sinton claim that NOCs are business driven market actors that 
because of their profit motivation make energy related investments motivated by 
economic reasons, regional imbalances or technological transfers. Behavior of NOCs 
is seen as mainly commercially driven and relatively independent from government 
interests in energy security. The high degree of NOC autonomy results in a NOC 
company investment policy that can be seen as relatively independent from 
government foreign policy goals inspired by energy security. (Jiang, J., & Sinton, J. 
2011) 
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China’s outward FDI has changed in every important respect. In terms of 
objectives it has moved from being politically to being commercially motivated. In 
terms of key actors, central government has given way to local government and, now, 
to enterprise led activity. Finally, in terms of strategic orientations, natural resource 
seeking investment has broadened to a much wider range of objectives including 
market seeking, technology seeking, risk diversification and other objectives common 
to MNCs worldwide. (Hong, E., & Sun, L. 2006) 
The Chinese government over the years has become increasingly more 
dependent on Chinese oil corporations and, as a result of their economic might, these 
firms are helping to intensify the diffusion of power in Chinese politics. NOCs have 
become business driven market actors that because of their profit motivation make 
energy related investments motivated by economic reasons, regional imbalances or 
technological transfers and not primarily to support state interests. (Jiang, J., & 
Sinton, J. 2011; Downs, E. 2006)  
 
Government control versus NOC autonomy 
A second  paradox related to the first one, is the government control versus NOC 
autonomy paradox. In this paradox the extent to which the government is able to 
determine or influence the company policy of NOCs is set against the extent to which 
NOCs are able to make investment decisions autonomous from the government. In the 
Realist mercantilist perception of NOC’s FDI, oil companies are puppets whose 
actions are completely controlled by Beijing’s puppeteers.  
Liberal and institutionalist explanations consider NOC investments to be the 
result of business driven more or less autonomous NOC company decision-making, 
not necessarily under direct government influence. According to the business is 
business camp, NOCs are market orientated and able to operate with a high degree of 
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autonomy from the central government. Since the 1970s the fragmentation of the 
energy bureaucracy caused by its reorganization enabled NOC managers to go for 
profit maximization, NOC’s have a high leverage on the government due to China’s 
energy import dependency and the top of the NOC management is to a high level 
integrated in the energy bureaucracy resulting in NOC influence on the formation of 
foreign energy policy. (Blanchard, J. M. F. 2011(b)) 
Downs uses the institutionalist argument that the unclear structure and 
weakening of the energy bureaucracy over the years, entailed a waning authority of 
the government over the energy sector. Through this infiltration of the bureaucracy 
NOC’s were able to influence decision making to advance their own interests. 
Because of the small size of the energy bureau’s staff, a bureau established in 1993 
overseeing China’s energy policy, it got so overwhelmed by the amount of projects 
running for approval that it had little time to devote to forging an energy strategy. 
Instead of formulating a clearly specified energy strategy according to which projects 
are approved ore denied, the energy bureau works the other way around, in the sense 
that the projects tend to shape energy policies instead of depending on such policies to 
guide project approval. (Downs 2004) 
Chih-Shian Liou shows that Chinese bureaucratic fragmentation has 
stimulated corporate autonomy of the NOCs. As agents of the Chinese central state 
the use of commercial logic by NOCs without worrying about not obeying the states 
directives is only possible because the NOC have gained substantial autonomy caused 
by the restructuring of the energy bureaucracy.  (Liou, C. S. 2009) 
“SOE managers have market incentives to pursue a profit-maximization 
strategy that does not always reflect state interests in venturing abroad. When an 
overseas project involves multiple Chinese SOEs, economic considerations and 
bureaucratic fragmentation often make them compete in ways that harm overriding 
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state interests. It is therefore analytically unsatisfying to assume that Chinese SOEs 
share the same interests as the Chinese central state.” (Liou, C. S. 2009: 673)   
 
The definition of economic statecraft: a state’s ability to make commercial actors 
behave in a manner that is conductive to producing security externalities that are in 
line with the strategic interests of the state, covers both paradoxes. The first part “the 
ability to make commercial actors behave in a certain manner” is applicable to the 
government control-vs-NOC autonomy paradox and the second part “producing 
security externalities that are in line with the strategic interests of the state” with the 
state centralism versus market domination paradox. After investigating conditions that 
determine the success or failure of Chinese economic statecraft I will be able to place 
NOC involvement in Angola and Brazil somewhere on the lines of these paradoxes.  
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4. Theoretical Framework 
According to Putnam: “The politics of many international negotiations can usefully 
be conceived as a two level game at the national level, domestic groups pursue their 
interest by pressuring the government to adopt favorable polies and politicians seek 
power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, 
national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, 
while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments” (Putnam, R. D. 
1988: 434) Following Putnam’s logic this thesis aims unravel the entanglements of 
domestic and international aspects of Chinese oil diplomacy as such it takes both 
receiving country as well as sending county conditions into account. 
 In contrary to general IR theory which is primarily concerned with the 
patterns of outcomes of states interactions this thesis focusses on the dynamics behind 
states behavior in the international realm. Foreign Policy analysis (FPA), a subfield of 
international relations theory, will be used to conceptualize, explain and assess the 
role of agents and structure on the two levels of analysis (domestic and international) 
of this thesis. In the FPAs theoretical model a state’s relative material power holds a 
key position and is the departure point for the analysis of a state’s international 
behavior. (Smith, S. 1986)) 
  However while material power draws the basic contours of a state’s foreign 
policy it does not fully determine its foreign policy behavior. This depends on 
decision-makers perceptions of relative material power. “Relative material power 
refers to a state’s capabilities and resources to influence each other, and the relative 
position in the international system that derives from this. States material power 
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affects the way they perceive systemic forces and subsequently the way they behave.” 
(Alves, A. C. 2011: 22)  
Another important finding from the literature was that target states 
institutional environments play a key role explaining the success or failure of 
economic statecraft. Ivar Kolstad and Arne Wigg show that Chinese FDI in general is 
primarily targeted at countries with pour institutional conditions and large supplies of 
natural resources. The worse the institutional conditions the stronger Chinese FDI is 
attracted to the country. (Kolstad, I., & Wiig, A. 2012)Chinese companies have 
competitive advantages in countries with weak institutions. In contrast to companies 
from developed economies Chinese companies are experienced in navigating: 
“complex patron client relationships and personal and institutional favors in relative 
opaque and difficult business environments” and in “dealing with burdensome 
regulations and navigating around …. Opaque political constraints’ (Morck, R., 
Yeung, B., & Zhao, M. 2008: 17)  
Alves has done extensive research on the impact of economic signals in 
countries with different institutional environments. Her main finding was that the 
regional variation in the success of Chinese economic statecraft in the oil sector can 
be explained by: “a structural difference in the institutional framework of each 
region.” (Alves, A.C. 2011: 13) Although Chinese economic statecraft proved to be 
appropriate in the African context, it was unsuitable for the much more liberalized 
environment that characterizes South America. (Alves, A. C. 2011; Alves, A.C. 2012; 
Alves, A. C. 2013) 
 
Blanchard and Ripsman provide a framework to analyze the impact of target state 
institutions on the effectiveness of economic statecraft. According to them, the 
success of economic statecraft is not dependent on the magnitude of its economic 
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effect but on the level of pain or gain it engenders when these economic signals are 
translated into political costs or opportunities. There are two pathways of economic 
statecraft, a leaderships pathway and a key societal groups pathway. Regardless of the 
pathway it follows, the first three steps in the exercise of economic statecraft are the 
same. In the first step, raw economic stimuli are presented to the target state. The 
second step is the possible economic amplification or moderation of these stimuli 
because third parties add stimuli of their own. What remains are modified economic 
stimuli which are translated into political action after the calculation of the 
international and domestic political consequences by policy makers, before 
responding to the modified stimuli. 
In the key societal groups scenario the key societal groups are co-opted in the 
economic benefits of economic statecraft and pressure for compliance. In this case 
leaderships non-compliance to the modified economic stimuli, denies the key societal 
groups access to the economic benefits which, when these groups have sufficient 
power might result in political risks. In the leaderships scenario modified economic 
stimuli persuade the target state’s leader themselves that the costs of defying the 
modified economic stimuli are too high. In this case complying might result in 
resistance from key societal groups.  
The political effect of economic signals is dependent on the co-option of key 
societal groups in the economic costs and benefits of the raw economic stimuli. This 
is where the target states institutional framework enters the equation. According to 
Blanchard and Ripsman there are three things that can help protect the target 
government from outside interference, or can alternatively amplify the effect of 
economic statecraft. Firstly, Decision making autonomy, refers to the structural ability 
of the foreign-policy executive to select and implement policies when faced with 
domestic political opposition. Secondly, Capacity, encompasses the policy resources 
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available to the state, which affect its ability to co-opt or coerce key societal groups in 
the face of economic statecraft. And thirdly Legitimacy refers to the degree to which 
domestic groups acknowledge the leaders right to rule, respect the authority of the 
state, and defer to it. These three concepts fall under the overarching term stateness.  
A targets level of stateness determines the target states ability to defy the modified 
economic stimuli or to comply to the signals despite domestic opposition. In the first 
case stateness provides a buffer against domestic political fallout, from key societal 
groups experiencing economic opportunities from economic statecraft signals and in 
the second case high stateness enables policy change in concurrence with the senders 
demands even if key societal actors, experiencing economic costs, favor resistance. 
(Blanchard, J. M. F., & Ripsman, N. M. 2008)   
 
 
(leaderships pathway Blanchard, J. M. F., & Ripsman, N. M. 2008:12)    
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(Key societal groups pathway Blanchard, J. M. F., & Ripsman, N. M. 2008: 11)  
 
When investigating economic statecraft, the first thing to find out is the effect the 
sending state tries to achieve, in this case the security externality China aims for. 
Secondly, it has to made clear if the economic statecraft is targets the leadership or 
key domestic coalitions. The target states institutional framework influences the 
systemic forces at work and how those forces are perceived by the actors involved. It 
might not only be indicative for its relative material power but also on the relative 
power position of the actors engaged in China’s golden triangle and thereby on the 
sending states relative material power and perceptions thereof. Therefore, a third 
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focus is the impact, target state institutional conditions have on the Chinese domestic 
business government conditions determining the level of NOC autonomy and the 
power relations within China’s golden triangle. (Morck, R., Yeung, B., & Zhao, M. 
2008; Blanchard, J. M. F., & Ripsman, N. M. 2008) 
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5. Concepts and measurements 
This thesis takes both international and domestic level variables into account in the 
investigation of the conditions that determine success or failure of China’s economic 
statecraft. This chapter will describe the concepts and measurements used to do this. I 
will firstly go in to the international level and explain how the first hypothesis on 
international economic strategy is going to be tested, using the concept security 
externality. 
 In the second part of this chapter I will explain how Blanchard en Ripsman’s 
framework can be used to analyze the target countries domestic institutional structure. 
Applying this framework to China’s oil for infrastructure deals, makes it possible to  
test the second and third hypotheses and shed light on pathway of economic statecraft 
that China follows.  
In the third part of this chapter I will introduce five Chinese domestic 
business-government conditions that, according to Norris, have to be analyzed to 
determine the extent to which the government can direct and control its commercial 
actors. (Norris 2010) 
 
Security externalities 
Norris categorizes the externalities on the basis of their effects on the targets. The 
resulting typology captures the full range of security effects that may be generated as 
a consequence of economic activity. There are two broad categories of externalities, 
those acting through primarily economic channels and those externalities with a direct 
military effect. There are six causal pathways of externalization:  
1. Hollowing out, or the weakening of a target states military capability.  
 29 
2. Strategic transfer or the strengthening of the target states military capabilities.  
3. Corrosion, economic interaction aimed at the erosion of the health of the 
targets economy.  
4. Bolstering, where economic interaction improves the health of the target states 
economy.  
5. Coercive leverage, economic patterns generate structural dependence.  
6. Interest transformation, the interests, goals and objectives of the target state 
are redefined in such a way that it actually wants the same thing as the state 
engaging in this type of economic statecraft. (Norris 2010) 
 
The military types of security externalities, hollowing out and strategic transfer are 
aimed to directly increase or decrease the perceived level of security of the target 
state. Economic interaction either undermines the continuing commercial viability of 
firms, sectors or industries that directly contribute to states military power capabilities 
or it enhances a target states military capabilities through the acquisition of strategic 
goods, knowledge resources or dual use/ and or dedicated military technology.  
 In contrary to the military types of security externalities, security 
ramifications in economic externalities often second order consequences of the 
economic interaction, for example higher levels of security through increased 
economic interdependence. The economic branch is subdivided into two groups. The 
first group contains corrosion and bolstering or the types of externalities that affect the 
overall health of the target economy as an end in itself. In coercive leverage and 
interest transformation influencing economic interaction plays an instrumental rather 
than a teleological role. The target state economy is used as means in pursuit of 
accessing explorations rights and securing long term supply contracts in the oil 
industry as end. (Norris 2010) 
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Institutional structure 
The three elements of stateness are alternative paths to resisting the senders demands. 
A state with a high autonomy would be able to ignore domestic opposition generated 
by economic statecraft, a state with a high capacity could overcome opposition 
through economic or coercive means and a state with a high legitimacy could rally 
domestic opponents. Hence a state manifesting a high degree on one component of 
stateness has significant stateness, regardless of its levels of the other two 
components.  
Blanchard en Ripsman’s concept of stateness is meant to provide a broad 
definition applicable to economic statecraft in general, regardless of the sector of 
focus. According to O. Bayulgen and J. Ladewig , when NOCs as instruments of 
economic statecraft, a key focus should be the balance between executive and 
institutional capacity in the target country. “We hypothesize that high degrees of 
executive constraints create an investment environment that is credible for foreign 
investors only in political regimes that have the institutional capacity to build 
coalitions among veto players and resolve conflicts regarding investment policies. 
Weak executive constraints alternatively, are attractive to foreign investors in political 
regimes that lack the institutional capacity to mediate among veto players. Hence, 
both consolidated democracies and autocratic regimes can produce investment 
policies that are attractive to foreign investors.”(O. Bayulgen and J. Ladewig; 2004)  
Taken together the three components of stateness represents the totality of the 
multifaceted state-society relationship in a given polity. However, since a state 
manifesting a high degree on one component of stateness has significant stateness, 
regardless of its levels of the other two components and various authors have shown 
that executive constraints are of primary interest when investigating the effectiveness 
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of economic statecraft in the oil sector, the focus will be on the target countries 
institutional level of executive decision making autonomy. Blanchard en Ripsman 
provide five guiding questions which can be used to analyze a target countries 
institutional level of decision making autonomy.  
1. Is there a separation or a concentration of power? In short, does the executive/ 
leader dominate or does the legislature, the military or some other actor act as 
a veto player over foreign policy? 
2. I the executive a unitary actor or is it a coalition of parties or interest groups? 
3. Do different parties/ factions control different institutions of government 
4. Do existing political procedures facilitate autonomous action by the executive 
leader? Do key actors routinely defer to the executive in foreign affairs? 
(Blanchard, J. M. F., & Ripsman, N. M. 2008) 
 
Business-government conditions 
I will conclude this chapter with the introduction of Norris’s five Chinese domestic 
business-government conditions that have to be analyzed to determine the extent to 
which the government can direct and control its commercial actors. 
 
1. Compatibility of State and NOC goals 
The first condition the Compatibility of State and NOC goals can be placed within the 
state centralism vs. market domination paradox. It considers the question how closely 
the goals of the commercial actor are aligned with those of the principal? A high 
degree of alignment facilitates the ability of the state to achieve its goals since 
motivating the commercial actor to pursue goals that are complementary to what the 
commercial actor would do anyway is fairly easy. If the states goals are highly 
compatible with those of the commercial actors, the state would find it easier to 
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control or direct commercial actors in pursuit of its strategic national goals. (Norris 
2010) 
 
2. Structure of the market 
The second condition analyses the structure of the oil market and can also be placed 
within the first paradox. A market structure where various Chinese NOCs are present 
and more importantly, have incentives to compete with each other, can result in a 
situation where NOC commercial motivations get preference over Chinese 
governments strategic interests. In a fragmented market with a high diversity of 
foreign oil companies, the target state is less dependent on the Chinese NOCs, making 
it less susceptible to Chinese economic statecraft.  
 In a concentrated market structure NOC behavior is more easy to control and 
the Beijing as puppeteer scenario would be more likely. However monopolistic or 
duopolistic market structures may produce very large and powerful firms, that are 
likely to enjoy significant bargaining power vis a vis the government. (Norris 2010)  
 
3. Nature of the reporting relationship 
The third condition investigates the nature of the reporting relationship between the 
state and the commercial actor. The more direct these relationships are, the easier it 
will be for the government to exercise control over the commercial actors and vice 
versa indirect relationships result in a higher degree of NOC autonomy. (Norris 2010) 
 
4. Unity of the state. 
The fourth condition to access difference between NOC and government interests is 
the unity of the state. In situations where there are multiple competing and conflicting 
bureaucratic authorities or in situations in which the state is internally divided among 
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competing factions or groups, it would be more difficult to control and NOCs. In 
situation Characterized by a highly unified state there is less room for autonomous 
NOC expeditions. (Norris 2010) 
 
5. Resource endowments 
The last factor of importance to investigate the second paradox is the relative 
capabilities or resource endowments between the state and the commercial actors. If 
the state is endowed with a considerable budget, large staff of experienced 
professionals and a track record of active directions of commercial activities there 
would be a higher degree of control of commercial actors. However if the NOC 
possesses a significant pool of knowledge and financial resources it would be easier to 
obtain a higher degree of autonomy. (Norris 2010) 
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6. Case selection and Hypotheses 
The search for and diversification of oil import channels has resulted in cooperation 
agreements with partners all over the World: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan, Brazil 
and African oil producing countries like Angola. Especially the countries that can be 
characterized as relatively poor but also have large oil reserves are of special interest 
to China. (Kolstad, I., & Wiig, A. 2011; Downs, E. 2006) In order to satisfy the 
dragons raging thirst, the PRC has diversified its supply by developing an Asia based 
regional capacity for oil production that makes it less dependent on international 
shipping, and placed a firm foot on African shore in the energy development of the 
African continent. (Douglas, J. K., Nelson, M. B., & Schwartz, K. 2006) 
China and Angola singed a series of cooperative projects of the oil trade; on the 
other hand from economic perspective, the Chinese government helps Angola build its 
infrastructures, and cheap commodities as well. In 2006 the fruit of this investment 
paid off and Angola surpassed Saudi Arabia as China’s largest supplier of oil. (Yilin, 
J., & Shihua, L. 2012; Douglas, J. K., Nelson, M. B., & Schwartz, K. 2006; ) 
Brazil is China’s second largest supplier in the region after Venezuela. Bilateral 
trade between the countries has grown exponentially over the past decade, with 
Chinese commodities imports accounting for nearly half of total value, and reflecting 
the regional trend. In comparison to Angola, China’s import chart from Brazil is a bit 
more diversified, including foodstuffs (soy beans) and mining, along with oil. The 
discovery of new reservoirs spiked China’s strategic interest in the Brazilian oil 
industry. (Pereira, C., & de Castro Neves, J. A. 2012). 
While all three banks EXIM, CDB and ICBC are involved in the provision of 
Chinese credit lines to oil rich countries the infrastructure for oil deal framed in the 
context of financial development aid is only provided by the EXIM bank. Chinese oil 
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for infrastructure deals successfully provided Chinese access to oil equity and assets 
in Angola, production of 47000 bpd and between 20% and 50% ownership in four 
blocks. In Brazil on the other hand, the EXIM bank’s infrastructure for oil deal was 
only successfully implemented in the first phase of the construction of the GASENE 
gas pipeline linking Rio de Janeiro and Bahia states. (Gallagher, K. P., Koleski, K., & 
Irwin, A. 2012) 
The idea was that this project would open the door for projects on a similar 
basis in Brazil’s oil sector. However, the negotiations on the implementation of the 
“Angola mode” in Brazil stalled because there were resentments against the import of 
Chinese labor, Brazilian Law required 75% Brazilian content and the Brazils 
development bank, Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social 
(BNDES) didn’t want to make concessions to massive labor force, strict labor laws 
and leftist government. Soon after, the CDB replaced the EXIM bank on the 
GASENE project and became the primary source of Chinese credit extension in 
Brazil. (Alves, A. C. 2011) 
The two 20% ownership shares of Sinopec in Brazil were acquired as 
collateral to oil backed CDB loans not EXIM bank concessional loans. NOC 
acquisitions in Brazil independent from the golden triangle were far more successful. 
Independent Chinese NOC acquisition efforts in Angola on the other hand, were all 
unsuccessful. Apparently the golden triangle oil for infrastructure deal does not 
produce the same result in every country. Because China tried to enter the Brazilian 
oil sector using the same formula as in Angola and because of the high discrepancy 
between to two countries considering in the level of success this instrument of 
economic statecraft achieved, special attention will be paid to the oil for infrastructure 
deal. (Alves, A. C. 2011) 
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Golden triangle Petroleum assets in Angola and Brazil  
Angola Oil 
assets 
Consortium Reserves 
Share 
Chinese 
NOC’s  
Progress stage depth 
and crude 
liquid 
quota 
Sino-
pec 
Total 
50% 
Block 
18 
2004 
Op. BP50% 1 bn Production (largest find 
Plutonio, start Oct. 
2007); Deep-water 
(1,200-1,500 m); Light 
crude (33.2 API 
27.5% 
 
Reserves 
972 mn  
barrels 
 
Production 
47000 bpd 20% 
block 
15/06 
2006  
Op. ENI 35%; 
Sonagol E.P. 
15%; Total, 15%; 
Falcon 
Oil 5%; Gemas 
5% 
1.5bn Exploration (largest 
find: Cabaça South 
Oct. 
2010); Deep-water 
(400-1,500 m); Light 
crude (34 API) 
11% 
27.5
% 
Block 
17/06 
2006 
Op. Total26%; 
Sonangol 
E.P. 24%; Falcon 
Oil 5%; 
ACR 5%; Partex 
2.5%; Somoil 
10% 
1bn Exploration phase 
(largest find: 
Begonia, Apr. 2010); 
Deep-water (600-1,900 
m); Light crude (36 
API) 
15.3% 
40% 
block 
18/06 
2006 
Op. Petrobras 
30%;  Sonangol 
E.P. 20%; Falcon 
Oil 5%; Gemas 
5% 
700mn Exploration phase 
(Largest find: 
Magnesium-01, Nov. 
2009); Deep-water 
(750-1750 m); 
Medium crude (API 
around 20s) 
22% 
Brazil 20% 
Block 
BMP
AMA
-3 
Sinopec unknown Still at exploration 
phase 
20% Still at 
exploration 
phase 
20% 
Block 
BMP
AMA
-8 
Sinopec 20% 
Based on tables in (Alves, A. C. 2013) 
 
Hypotheses 
This thesis aims to enlighten processes involving the interaction between actors and 
structures on both the domestic and the international level of analysis. The first 
hypothesis has an international focus, and states that awareness among China’s 
leadership of its dependency on imported oil and the realization that China’s largest 
source of power is economic, results in economic statecraft strategies aimed at 
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security externalities that establish structures of economic interdependence between 
China and the target county.  
Given China’s experience in dealing with opaque and difficult business 
environments and burdensome regulations by establishing good relationships with the 
local political elite. And because China’s leadership reasons from a “mirror imaging 
bias” that emphasizes state control over market domination, the second hypothesis is 
that China’s s oil for infrastructure deals follow the leaderships pathway of economic 
statecraft. (Moreira, S. 2013; Lieberthal and Herberg 2006; Blanchard, J. M. F. 2011; 
Burgos Caceres, S., &Ear, S. 2012) 
A third related hypothesis zooms in on the target states domestic level. 
According to this hypothesis, Chinese oil for infrastructure deals in Angola were 
successful because the high level executive decision making autonomy enabled 
Angolan leadership to resist domestic opposition these deals failed in Brazil because 
its level of executive decision making autonomy isn’t sufficient to overcome domestic 
opposition. 
According to the fourth and final hypothesis there is an interaction effect 
between the target states institutions and the level of autonomy Chinese NOC enjoy 
versus their government. Weak target state institutional environments strengthen 
China’s relative power position versus the target county resulting in a higher ability to 
control its NOCs, strong target state institutional frameworks weaken the relative 
power position of China and thereby increases NOC autonomous decision making 
ability  
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7. Economic statecraft in Brazil and Angola: comparable 
types of externalities? 
 
This chapter will focus on the international level of analysis and test the first two 
hypotheses: 
1. Chinese economic statecraft strategies are aimed at security externalities that 
establish structures of economic interdependence, 
2. China’s oil for infrastructure deals follow the leaderships pathway of 
economic statecraft.  
Firstly, I will explain which type of security externality China aims for in Angola and 
Brazil. Secondly, I will access which pathway of economic statecraft China’s 
infrastructure for oil deal follows.  
 
Angola 
After nearly four decades of civil war Angola’s national infrastructure was devastated. 
Almost 80 percent of Angola’s transport infrastructure was still not operational in 
2009 (Corkin, L. 2012) After the end of Angola’s civil war, the Angolan government 
emphasized rapid reconstruction. (GAO. 2013) Because the blueprint for the 
infrastructure for oil loans was laid down in Angola, the infrastructure for loans 
structure as instrument on economic statecraft is also known as the Angola mode. 
(Corkin, L. 2011) 
The Chinese state, in the light of its no strings attached policy, provides the 
money without the conditionality’s. (Sogge, D. 2009) “China, essentially replaced 
conditionality-ridden OECD donors and Bretton Woods institutions as the source of 
credit for Angola’s ‘reconstruction’, and is unruffled by fashionable Western good 
governance agendas.”(De Oliveira, R. S. 2009: 623)  
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While China’s prime interest is securing long term supply contracts and accessing 
exploration rights for reasonable prices and Angola’s prime interest is diversifying its 
economy, Angola and China have a common interests in the improvement of the 
country’s infrastructure. Or as Alves claims: “By instigating the gradual emergence of 
economic interdependence, China hopes to build up its leverage over weaker states, 
so as to enact coalitions that will favor its interests in the long run.” (Alves, A. C. 
2011: 54)This has made the infrastructure for oil deals a very effective instrument of 
Chinese economic statecraft.  
Chinese success in securing long term supply contracts and accessing 
exploration rights becomes apparent when looking at Chinese Angolan trade figures. 
Angolan oil exports to China have increased sevenfold since China first became 
involved in Angola in 2002. Overtaking Saudi Arabia, Angola has become China’s top 
oil provider in 2010. China’s year-on-year trade with Angola totaled US$2.04 billion 
in January 2010, with Chinese acquisitions totaling US$1.85 billion since 2002. 
(Burgos, S., & Ear, S. 2012(a)) 
While the practice of Chinese economic statecraft in Angola improved the 
Angolan economy, the causal pathway of bolstering necessitates the exertion of the 
increased power the target state in the international arena that benefits the sending 
state. (Norris 2010) Examples of a bolstering strategy are for example the British 
support for its allies in the Napoleonic allies, Soviet aid and economic ties to Cuba, 
and the formation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT. (Norris 
2010) Whereas coercive leverage is employed to enforce state A’s compliance to state 
B, interest transformation actually seeks to alter state A’s goals and bring them in 
closer alignment with B’s interest. The security externality resulting from the 
economic interaction between Angola and China best resembles the interest 
transformation pathway of security externalities.  
 40 
  
Brazil  
Due to Brazils rising profile as an oil producer, China’s interest in Brazils oil industry 
increased substantially towards the end of the decade. The increase in volume of 
Brazils oil exports to China from 2009 to 2010 indicates the emergence of a new 
south-south dimension as China attempts to diversify its supply sources. The potential 
of Brazil’s pre-salt reservoirs will soon place Brazil amongst the world’s largest oil 
producers.( Aykut, D., & Goldstein, A. 2007) 
Just like in Angola, the framework agreements and official calls from Beijing 
to engage in infrastructure construction were made in Brazil. Unlike Chinese 
investment in Angola that kicked off in 2004, Chinese investment stock in Brazil 
remained small throughout most of the first decade. This changed during the last years 
of this decade and in 2009 China had become Brazil’s largest trade partner. The leap 
in Chinese investments is an important indicator of the rise of a new stage in the 
bilateral relationship.(Eunsuk Hong and Laixiang Sun 2006) 
The investments followed two patterns, the inclusion of Brazil in the 
international base of suppliers of raw materials for China, and the entry of the Chinese 
into the consumer market and the Brazilian industrial area. China tries to incorporate 
Brazil into its international base of suppliers of raw materials by actively participating 
in the broad and growing Brazilian consumer market. The predominance of state-
owned companies and Chinese investment on the Brazilian consumer market and 
industrial area indicate that China’s interest is not a temporary matter but aimed at 
establishing a pattern of structural complex interdependence. (Buckley, P at al 2007) 
 According to a CBBC rapport, Chinese investments in Brazil are mainly 
directed at the ongoing integration between the two economies and “there is no doubt 
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that the Chinese are making Brazil part of their international supply base for natural 
resources.” (Silva, E.R. Soares, A 2011: 24) 
Because the economic interaction between Brazil and China is obviously 
aimed at establishing economic integration providing both with a common stake in the 
success of the integrated economic entity. (Eunsuk Hong and Laixiang Sun 
2006)Chinese leaderships aim at the interests transformation externality is even more 
obvious than in Angola. By investing in Brazilian infrastructure and consumer market 
China seeks to alter Brazils economic goals and objectives and tries to align them 
with China’s strategic interest in resource security. (Norris William J.2010) 
 
The pathway of the infrastructure for oil deals 
By examining the “Angola mode” through the framework provided by Blanchard and 
Ripsman, it can be determined if this instrument of Chinese economic statecraft 
follows the leadership or the key societal groups pathway. (Blanchard, J. M. F., & 
Ripsman, N. M. 2008) 
The Angola mode offers raw economic stimuli in the form of oil for 
infrastructure loans provided by EXIM bank. The agreement for these loans has to be 
formalized in a cooperation framework agreement with the sending and the target 
state government. In this framework agreement the general terms of the raw economic 
stimulant (the loan) such as the volume of oil as collateral, the interest rate and 
maturity are determined. (Drallle, T) 
The infrastructure for oil deals have two major features. Firstly, the loans are 
extended on the condition that the money is invested in infrastructural development. 
This is founded by two legal instruments: a framework cooperation agreement signed 
by the two governments in which the general terms of the loan are stated and a loan 
agreement signed by the EXIM bank and the borrower. The loans are administered on 
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a project basis through the borrowers account with EXIM bank and a condition to the 
loans is that the infrastructural works are assigned to Chinese contractors. Through the 
borrowers account the payments are made directly to these contractors. This means 
the money actually never leaves China. (Foster, V. 2009)    
Secondly, repayment is done using proceeds from sale of oil directly to the 
Chinese company favorably with access to oil equity as collateral. Before the loans 
are extended a sovereign guarantee is required. The low creditworthiness of 
developing countries is obviated by placing the local NOC as guarantor of the loan 
and by requiring repayment to be done in kind. This is done by selling a contractually 
recorded amount of barrels of oil per day directly from the host countries NOC to the 
Chinese oil company. The figure of the barrels of oil per day to service the loan is 
allowed to fluctuate according to fluctuating oil prices. This is why Foster et al claim 
that the emphasis of the Chinese state in the credit deals tied to repayment in oil is not 
on creating a hedge against future oil prices but instead a way of securing a steady 
supply in line with Chinese oil security goals. (Foster, V. 2009)    
The infrastructural improvements made possible through the loans might 
enable the development of other economic sectors which might provide possible 
investments opportunities from abroad. On the other hand, Chinese leverage on such 
an important sector of the economy and the close relation between the Chinese and 
the target state government might discourage others to invest because they fear 
unequal competitive advantages. This resembles the third step, or third party 
amplification resulting in modified economy stimuli. (Blanchard, J. M. F., & 
Ripsman, N. M. 2008 
If the state’s leadership decide to coopt with the economic statecraft this is 
where the domestic level comes into play. (Blanchard, J. M. F., & Ripsman, N. M. 
2008) The infrastructural improvements might also benefit local entrepreneurs from 
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other sectors, make the country more accessible for products from other countries and 
provide easier access to markets abroad. On the other hand there is also the danger of 
premature opening up of the domestic market, where the target states domestic 
products are unable to compete with Chinese import. Additionally, the obligatory 
contracting of Chinese companies to execute the infrastructural works can result in a 
lot of resistance from domestic unions and labor organizations. There is also a danger 
that the domestic corporate elite fears too much Chinese leverage and influence on the 
countries domestic economy and oil industry. Dependence lurks beneath the surface 
when engaging in China’s interest transformation programs. (Alves, A.C. 2012). 
If target state leaders decide to coopt, a high level of executive decision 
making autonomy will provide a buffer against domestic political fallout, that is, it 
will restrict the reach of the political costs, to prevent danger to the leadership’s 
position. (Blanchard, J. M. F., & Ripsman, N. M. 2008) In contrast states with a lower 
degree executive decision making autonomy are more vulnerable to domestic political 
punishment. Domestic NOC’s and labor organizations will have considerable 
influence on executive policy formation and execution and will have a greater 
propensity and ability to resist a countries compliance to economic statecraft.  
 
(Alves, A. C. 2011:52) 
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Chapter conclusion 
As predicted by first and the second hypothesis, both in Angola and Brazil China’s 
economic statecraft is aimed at target state interest transformation by establishing 
interdependence between its own and the target countries economic system. With the 
infrastructure for oil deals Beijing tries to implement the leadership pathway of 
economic statecraft in Angola and Brazil however, with differing levels of success. 
(Blanchard, J. M. F., & Ripsman, N. M. 2008) 
In Angola these deals led to a successful obtainment of long term supply contracts 
and exploration rights while in the Brazilian oil sector similar efforts did not achieve 
the same result. In the next two chapters I will investigate if the success of China’s 
economic statecraft in Angola can be attributed to the high level of executive decision 
making autonomy, and the failure of economic statecraft in Brazil due to a lack 
thereof.  
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8. The target state domestic level: Angola  
As described in chapter three this thesis aims to shed light on processes involving at 
least two states, a sending and a receiving state, on two levels of analysis, domestic 
and international. It has been explained that on the international level, the Chinese 
government tries to achieve interest transformation in Angola and Brazil through 
establishing structures of economic interdependence using the leaderships pathway of 
economic statecraft.  
The next two chapters will test the third hypothesis for the Angolan and Brazilian 
case, and assess how target states institutional conditions impact the target countries 
relative material power position and the impact this has on its susceptibility to 
economic statecraft. The success or failure of economic statecraft is dependent on 
political costs or opportunities it engenders. Whether economic statecraft results in 
political costs or opportunities depend on the extent to which key societal groups are 
co-opted by the economic opportunities or costs of economic statecraft. (Blanchard, J. 
M. F., & Ripsman, N. M. 2008) 
If key societal groups are to a high degree co-opted in the economic benefits of 
economic statecraft and push for policy change, a high degree of executive decision 
making autonomy helps state leadership to resist these demands. If key societal 
groups are to a high degree co-opted in the costs of economic statecraft, the 
institutional level of executive decision making autonomy provides a buffer for the 
political fallout for leaders who do want to comply. This chapter shall review the co-
option of key societal groups and the level of executive decision making autonomy in 
Angola and in the next chapter the process shall be repeated for Brazil. (Blanchard, J. 
M. F., & Ripsman, N. M. 2008) 
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The cooption of key societal groups  
The state enterprise Sonangol has been a crucial instrument in the leadership’s hands. 
Created in 1976 as the national oil company, it is today a big and successful holding 
company. While Angola’s institutional environment is generally characterized as a 
fragile decaying system the competent and robust institution Sonagol forms “the 
centerpiece in the management of Angola’s successful failed state” (Sogge, D. 2009) 
Up to half of Angola’s yearly oil revenues are disappearing in the presidency’s 
system of parallel finances where oil-backed loans are “deployed for general 
governments use”. Oil operations run through an extensive network of offshore 
accounts from which commissions are then paid to regime notables and foreign 
middlemen. The deals stipulating that loans should be serviced through the direct 
delivery of oil perfectly fitted with China’s oil for infrastructure deals and inevitable 
made Sonangol party to these loans. Oil backed loans provide the state elite with an 
easy source of money, that due to complex offshore financial constructions is outside 
any sort of control. (De Oliveira, R. S. 2009) 
The executive power uses Sonagol to form a “parallel state” far more efficient 
than the deteriorated official state structures. This parallel state takes on complex 
operations involving foreign partners in a way official government organs like the 
Ministry of Finance or the Bank of Angola could not. After its establishment in 1976 
the state owned Sonagol company took over the operations and infrastructure left 
behind by Mobil, Texaco, Fina and Shell, which left Angola after it became 
independent. The first petroleum law promulgated two years later placed Sonangol at 
the core or the Angolan oil industry. (Sogge, D. 2009) 
The oil revenues of Angola’s completely state controlled NOC Sonangol, 
enable the Angolan state to provide solid enough credibility and sovereignty to 
comply with contracts as enforced by international lawyers, judges and mediators. It 
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exercises a monopoly of coercive power in zones relevant to oil corporations and has 
built alliances with colluding political and corporate actors abroad, acquiring both 
technical capacities in the oil sector as well as in the military, financial and media 
realms. The Sonagol centered parallel state has resulted in a marginalization of formal 
institutions and an increase of the executive power of the presidency. (Hodges, T. 
2001).   
Most of Sonangol’s senior technocrats are also supportive of this process. 
Despite their expressions in interview of desires to roll back the patrimonial character 
of Angola’s political economy, they do not actually envisage having to compete in a 
genuinely open market. To maintain the status quo Sonangol creates opportunities for 
the well-connected but non-entrepreneurial individuals, while genuine 
entrepreneurship is made next to impossible. By sharing rentier opportunities and 
some of the spoils of the oil boom across the elite continuing support for the 
presidency is secured.    
Sonangol Group has been not only the manager of the Futungo’s phantom 
revenue flows, but also the enabler of elite rentierism across important non-oil 
dimensions of the domestic economy, simultaneously guaranteeing that all profitable 
business opportunities are arbitrated by state rulers via the company. (Sogge, D. 
2009) 
 
Level of executive decision making autonomy 
Angola’s dual state enables a small key societal key societal to profit from the 
economic opportunities Chinese economic statecraft offers. However the vast 
majority of Angolan society that does not profit from the oil revenues still poses a 
possible political threat to Angolan leadership. Using Blanchard and Ripsmans 
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questions I shall assess the extent to which the level institutional of decision making 
autonomy forms a buffer for the political costs of Angola’s parallel state.   
 
1. Is there a separation or a concentration of power? In short, does the 
executive/ leader dominate or does the legislature, the military or some other 
actor act as a veto player over foreign policy? 
Formally speaking, Angola is constitutional parliamentary democracy, a political 
system that operates through executive, legislative and judicial branches whose 
separate powers allow for checks and balances among all three. In a parliamentary 
democracy multiple parties, civil society organizations and free media enable the 
public to make its voice heard. However in Angola the formal constitutional system is 
merely a legitimating façade of formal arrangements that hides the way politics 
actually work.  
In reality the Angolan president’s office uses the dominant People's Movement 
for the Liberation of Angola party (MPLA) to manage a clientalist system of state 
control. This monopoly is in some cases even formally expressed, for example in the 
executives powers to appoint or dismiss all officials of the judicial branch, from the 
supreme court to the audit court. Informally key bodies like the national electoral 
commission are stacked with ruling party adherents. The lack of financial autonomy, 
minimal resources and the narrow mandates of the Parliament severely restrict the 
effective power of the parliament. These kinds of expressions of executive power 
points neither to the checks nor the balances necessary to maintain a parliamentary 
democracy. ( Rajan, S. C. 2011)   
The parliament is mainly a platform for the ruling party the MPLA which got 
59 percent of all seats in the first elections in 1992, 87 percent in the 2008 elections 
and 82 percent in the last elections in 2012. In practical terms this means that the one-
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party system of pre 1992 has been restored and that the political debate and checks 
and balances take place behind the closed doors of the party/ governmental leadership. 
(Campos, I. 2008) 
The judicial branch has the same weak and subordinated position to central 
authorities. A formal legal system has never been accessible to ordinary Angolans. 
Suits of citizens against authorities are a curiosity and the government actively 
promotes less formal and binding approaches to dispute settlement that exclude the 
judicial branch. These bodies have no mandates to enforce laws or impose legally 
binding outcomes and merely sever to alert the authorities to problems without 
requiring them to find solutions. (Sogge, D. 2009) 
The legal framework assigns Sonangol with quasi regulatory competences 
such as the organization of oil auctions and signing production sharing agreements 
with exploration and production activities. Foreign companies are only allowed to 
enter the country if they are associated to Sonangol. Its position in the sector is further 
strengthened by legal aspects that give Sonangol the right of first refusal when one of 
its associates sells its position or part of it in a block. Other institutional players that 
are legally obliged to act as regulators for the sector, such as the Ministry of Finance 
and the Ministry of Petroleum are dwarfed by Sonangol’s strong hold over the 
industry. (De Oliveira, R. S. 2009; Sogge, D. 2009) 
The regime is able to control and color the information available to the public, 
through its command of the airwaves and power to intimate of buy off critics. 
Transparency about official budgets and essential political and economic matters is 
highly restricted keeping the general public and probably some in the political class 
completely in the dark posing major barriers to open informed politics. (Corkin, L. 
2011). 
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2. Is the executive a unitary actor or is it a coalition of parties or interest 
groups? 
As a country with a history tainted red by blood, it comes as no surprise that Angolan 
actors, before trying anything else, usually take paths of violence and coercion. 
Thanks to a flow of petrodollars and a free market in military goods and services, 
Angola is today a highly militarized and ‘securitized’ place. This highly securitized 
state is very capable to keep domestic parties and interests groups under control, 
guarding the executives monopoly. (Sogge, D. 2009) 
The authority of the formally independent civilian politicians has been 
dependent on pacts with senior military officials. Effective, disciplined and loyal 
armed forces are a fundamental project in Angolan state building. The recruitment, 
training discipline and compensation of military and security officials is closely 
monitored by senior figures with a close eye for the social make-up of the security 
branches in order to reduce the risk of dissention and disloyalty. The rise of possible 
opponents is prevented by a combination of deterrence by the securitized state and an 
inclusive approach, recruiting officers of ethnic groups from which the opposing 
parties and their insurgent armies draw adherents. In this way existing parties are 
conditioned and subdued by the MPLA’s executive power.  (Aguilar, R., & 
Goldstein, A. 2009; Sogge, D. 2009) 
 
3. Do different parties/ factions control different institutions of government 
Oil and war changed the focus of the Angolan economy from being primarily geared 
to global markets thanks chiefly to agrarian exports, to a situation where the agrarian 
economy is destroyed and the demographic center of gravity lays in the urban areas. 
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In the Angolan resource dependent economy the earnings and investment capital of 
local production systems are dependent on markets driven by the consumption of 
hydrocarbons elsewhere in the world this means that the urban enclaves are poorly 
linked with local production systems. Angola’s highest source of revenue is the elite 
export of oil to other countries, domestic politics therefor has little to do with 
reciprocal relationships between citizens as payers of taxes or producers of goods on 
the one hand and a political class in need of those taxes and goods on the other. (De 
Oliveira, R. S. 2009) 
Central authorities are aware of the danger of this lack of connection between 
the civil society (no matter how poorly it might be defined) and the government. This 
makes them hyper-alert to incipient separatism. Central authorities steer and finance 
sub-national governance in layers down to local levels, keeping provincial elites 
“inside the tent” by making every subnational government only accountable upward, 
to the top authorities in Luanda. (De Oliveira, R. S. 2009) 
 
4. Do existing political procedures facilitate autonomous action by the executive 
leader?  
One of the main goals of the Angolan parallel state is to enable autonomous action of 
the executive via Sonangol. Sonangol’s impact on Angola’s economy does not stop in 
the oil industry, the company has a tendency to invest directly, or allow insiders to 
invest in all branches of Angolan economy. Because of Sonangol’s vast amount of 
physical resources, personnel and political capital this meddling with economic 
sectors unrelated to its core business leads to a squeezing out of competitors. This 
monopolization of the whole Angolan economy enables the upper ranks of the 
bureaucracy, the military, the party, and their families to steer the revenues of almost 
all economic activity in Angola in their direction. (De Oliveira, R. S. 2009) 
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Angola is too valuable an oil province to pass over, but outside the sheltered 
oil enclave Angola is one of the riskiest economies worldwide to invest in. Sonangol’s 
foreign business partners, major oil firms, service and construction companies, banks 
and lawyers, oblige because the real burden of this monopolistic drive does not affect 
them. In sum, what happens in Angola happens according to Sonangol standards as 
determined by its political masters or it does not happen at all. (GAO, 2013; Aguilar, 
R., & Goldstein, A. 2009) 
 
5. What are the prevailing norms of the conduct of foreign policy? Do they 
encourage executive/leader independence in foreign affairs or executive/ 
leader restraint? 
That the political masters of Sonagol determine what happen in Angola also means 
that they determine the norms of the conduct of foreign policy. Just as business and 
politics on the domestic level foreign affairs in Angola are characterized by a high 
level of executive independence. Because of its oil, there will always be an interest by 
multiple external and internal actors in maintaining the central structure, whatever the 
domestic political conditions. (GAO, 2013) 
Angola’s oil wealth also ensures that there will be enough resources available 
to prop up incumbents, guarantee the enrichment of the political elite and coerce or 
co-opt enemies resulting in a political order that is on the one hand violent, arbitrary, 
exploitative but on the other hand fairly reliable. Because of these stable interest, and 
Sonangol’s financial and political dominance the structure of politics is stable and 
viable despite the unstable and fragmentary political process. 
The relationship between the Angolan state and the oil companies will work in 
a mutually beneficial way as long as two conditions are in place. Firstly, the parallel 
economic system insulating oil companies form the unreliability of local conditions 
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and secondly, the maintenance of the two sorts of state organization. This condition 
provides an acceptable legal framework and the logistical efficiency to enable the 
formation of oil enclaves where companies can operate freely and do not face the rent 
seeking, contractual uncertainty or threat of expropriation that is so widespread 
outside the oil industry. (De Oliveira, R. S. 2009) 
The second condition is the existence of the parallel state. The two sorts of 
state organization refer to both the failed and the successful part of the Angolese state. 
Failed because the Angola needs extensive instruments of coercion, in the form of one 
of Africa’s largest armed forces, numerous police and paramilitary forces and an 
efficient intelligence apparatus to keep domestic interests groups and parties under 
control. Successful in the sense that Sonagol is an entity that articulates state interest 
in the oil sector with comparative prowess, bringing together its scarce human 
resources and enabling success in negations and joint ventures as well as access to oil-
backed loans. (De Oliveira, R. S. 2009) 
In short, limitations of human resources and of predictability, transparency, 
and the rule of law in the non-enclave Angolan economy mean that it is impossible to 
engage in it without encountering its rentier, unproductive dominant logic. Sonangol 
may well be ‘a strategic island of competence ring-fenced against chaos elsewhere, 
but it is also very much part of that chaos and ultimately unfit to rise above it. (Sogge, 
D. 2009) 
 
Conclusion 
Despite the fact that Angola lacks legitimacy the parallel state structure does provide 
substantial amounts of decision making autonomy and capacity. Its parallel state in 
symbiosis with Sonangol means that the state has ample amounts of policy resources 
available to co-opt or coerce key societal groups. Key opposition and societal groups 
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that form a possible threat are adopted into the economic political system floating on  
oil. But this dual structure especially enables the executive power to select and 
implement policies with total disregard of possible domestic opposition.  
Angola’s parallel state enables a high degree of structural autonomy considering 
the actors with institutional power to contribute to policy making in the economic oil 
enclaves, while simultaneously effectively subduing or oppressing opposition in the 
domestic institutional chaos. Resulting in a high degree of stateness for the Angolan 
state. This parallel state depends for its survival on the flow of financial revenues 
from the oil industry, which leads to relatively weak relative power perceptions of the 
Angolan elite towards China despite the high level of stateness.  
In a strange marriage of the latest expertise in oil exploration and the narrow 
enrichment goals of a failed state leadership, Sonagol is insulated from the rest of the 
incompetent state apparatus and engages successfully in high finance, business 
contracts and high tech oil technology. Engagement with Angola means engaging with 
Sonagol both on the national as well as the international level but despite its political 
key role it does not phrase itself in a politically intrusive way but is in its smooth 
transnational sophistication loyal to the presidency further enabling executive 
independence in foreign affairs. The third hypothesis can be confirmed for the 
Angolan case, Chinese oil for infrastructure deals perfectly fit Angola’s high levels of, 
institutionally anchored, executive decision making autonomy. 
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9. The target state domestic level: Brazil 
Since the military relinquished power in in 1985 institutional design has been a 
dominant theme in the social science discussion on Brazil. The question of 
institutional design lays at the heart of the ongoing debates about the sustainability of 
Brazilian democracy. This chapter will look closer at the co-option of key societal 
groups and the level of executive decision making autonomy in Brazil. 
 
Co-option of key societal groups 
According to Kröger the state corporatism implanted in Brazilian society in the 1930s 
still continues to influence the Brazilian economy and society. In state corporatism the 
state actively promotes links between the leaders of both companies and labor and its 
own structures. Corporatist systems organize power relations between economic 
actors along the lines of traditional capital rich enterprises in an environment of 
limited competition and a strong government distributing all the available credit. State 
corporatist structures also mean that trade unions and industries do not organize 
horizontally over industry or profession-specific lines but hierarchically. (Kröger, M. 
2012) 
He claims that Brazil has been building a neo-mercantilist development approach 
based on non-institutional restrictions of imports and active promotion of exports. The 
main goal of this strategy is to increase the state clout in international political 
economy, which allows greater security and expansion, and control over territories; 
economic gains are the means to achieve these main goals. However, the Brazilian 
strategy in which an active state promotes global market competitiveness enforces the 
problematic institutional and structural arrangements of state corporatism. It seems to 
be exacerbating rather than resolving the power concentration and structural 
inequality identified with it. (Kröger, M. 2012) 
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The strong business constituencies of Brazil’s pluralist democratic regime are 
reflected in the institutional structure of its oil sector. Under the authoritarian 
developmental state (1946-1989) oil exploitation was monopolized by the national oil 
company Petrobras but in the 1990s the state gradually assumed a regulatory role and 
Petrobras lost its exclusive rights. A constitutional amendment in 1995 opened the 
industry up to participation by other public and private enterprises, both national and 
foreign. As a company of mixed capital both public and private Petrobras is 
accountable to two different constituencies. A private stake motivated by pure revenue 
interests and the states golden share that is answerable to public constituencies. 
(Alves, A. C. 2012) 
China became Brazil’s largest trading partner in 2009. Although the commodities 
share in Brazilian export to China rose sharply over the period 2000-2011 the most 
significant shift in bilateral trade was the addition of oil to the Brazil-China exports. 
China made some serious efforts to tap into the countries oil industry. Several 
multibillion dollar credit lines for infrastructure development were announced but 
none materialized. The only credit line that did was a non-oil backed loan for the 
construction of a gas pipeline linking Rio de Janeiro with the Bahia states (GASENE 
project). Looking at the way this deal materialized the strong corporate influence on 
the formation and execution of Brazilian energy policy becomes clear. (Alves, A. C. 
2012) 
The EXIM bank expressed its interest in funding the project in 2004 on the usual 
oil for loans condition that Sinopec was signed up as contractor. Part of Hu Jintao’s 
official visit to Brazil was signing the GASENE cooperation agreement. However 
Brazil’s National Development Bank (BNDES) decided not to agree with the Chinese 
condition to make Petrobras guarantor of the loan and obligation, also in line with 
Chinese economic statecraft, to procure a large share of labor, services and goods in 
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China. These kinds of concessions were impossible to make for the BNDES because 
of Brazils large industrial base, thriving services sector and strict labor and import 
laws. (Alves, A. C. 2011) 
With provisional loans the project was eventually kickstarted in March 2006 and 
Petrobras allowed Sinopec to control the execution of the first phase of the project. 
Because the EXIM Bank kept pushing for a larger share of Chinese content Petrobras 
cancelled Sinopec’s contract for the second phase of the GASENE project. A new 
tender was launched and eventually the CDB was authorized to replace EXIM bank. 
When we compare development banks, CDB offers mostly commercial interest rate. 
(Gallagher, K. P., Koleski, K., & Irwin, A. 2012: 11)  
That the CDB was chosen over the EXIM bank despite the more commercial terms 
of its loans indicates that the BNDES preferred to pay a higher interest over the 
obligatory high Chinese content of the EXIM bank conditions. Considering the power 
of Brazil’s key societal groups, the large industrial base and thriving services sector, 
BNDES could not make concessions considering the Brazilian work share. Rumors of 
importation of Chinese workers ignited massive waves of protest among the powerful 
labor unions of the country. The EXIM bank distributes loans under the financial aid 
umbrella with strategic interests instead of probability in mind. Thereby are the loans 
extended to governments rather than companies which gives the Chinese government 
a far greater ability to determine the conditions for the loans, making it an effective 
instrument of economic statecraft. (Alves, A. C. 2011) 
The interest rates on the lines of credit extended to Petrobras are based on the 
London Interbank Offered Rate. Because the CDB credits unlike those of the EXIM 
do not fall under the aid umbrella and are extended to companies instead of 
governments loans from the CDB gives Petrobras far more leeway considering the 
conditions of the loan. EXIM credit extension is primarily motivated by the strategic 
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interests of the Chinese government, the fact that commercial motives play a larger 
role in the CDB credit extension makes it a more attractive partner for Petrobras. 
(Downs 2011) 
In October 2008, as the global financial crisis deepened and falling oil prices 
threatened Petrobras’ plans to develop its high-cost pre-salt oil resources, CDB 
offered Petrobras a substantial line of credit because development of the pre-salt fields 
would boost Brazil’s oil exports to China but primarily because the oil put up as 
collateral would make the loan highly profitable. (Downs, E. 2011) CDB’s 2009 loan 
to Petrobras eventually led to Sinopec’s 2 20% 205 blocks in the Para-Maranhao basin 
grew out of its search for business opportunities in Brazil (DOWNS). But in a way the 
credit extension by CDB instead of the EXIM bank can also be seen as an Chinese 
adoption to take the cooption of Brazil’s key societal groups into account in exercising 
economic statecraft. Because of Petrobras its susceptibility to political influence in its 
decision making due to accountability to its private shareholders, CDBs loan was 
directly negotiated with and extended to Petrobras instead of the Brazilian executive. 
Secondly the loan was aimed at the development of the pre-salt reservoirs instead of 
infrastructure, and thirdly, learning from the GASENE experience, the Chinese 
content was reduced to a 30% minority parcel. (Alves, A. C. 2011) 
Despite the fact that the CDB energy-backed loans are part of the governments 
energy security strategy, they are better viewed as transactions developed and shaped 
by multiple actors pursuing multiple interests, especially profitability. CDB’s loans 
demonstrate that even cross-border energy deals that serve Beijing’s strategic 
priorities and involve close coordination between the government, state-owned 
enterprises and banks are not necessarily part of a national blueprint for energy 
security. Business often comes first. (Downs, E.S. 2009) 
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Level of executive decision making autonomy  
Where the key societal groups in Angola co-opted by Chinese economic statecraft 
profited from the oil for infrastructure deals, and therefore were eager to cooperate, in 
the Brazilian case other interests are at play.  
 
1. Is there a separation or a concentration of power? In short, does the executive/ 
leader dominate or does the legislature, the military or some other actor act as 
a veto player over foreign policy? 
 
Compared with Angola there are much more checks and balances in place in the 
Brazilian democracy to control the executive. The judiciary, the legislative and the 
federal states empowered by Brazils 1988 constitutions are able to effectively use 
their democratic prerogatives to block executive initiatives that counter their interests. 
The Judiciary system has multiple appeal possibilities and involves several layers of 
courts at federal and state levels. Unlike Angola the Judiciary system is able to operate 
independent from the executive power and forms an effective check. (Power, T. J. 
2010) 
In congress consisting of a Chamber of Deputies with 513 seats and a State 
Chamber with 81 seats, and exercising legislative power the loyalties are divided 
between party and state allegiance. Unlike Angola Brazil is characterized by extreme 
party fragmentation due to which it is almost a certainty that the Brazilian president 
will never control a majority of the seats in Congress. Even when the executive 
constructs a broad coalition, parties can and do abandon the president on key notes. 
(note) Because regional lobby groups cut across ideological boundaries it is difficult 
to enforce party discipline in Congress but also in the government itself. (Figueiredo, 
A. C., & Limongi, F. 2000)  
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 The effective lobbying in Brazil means that material interest of powerful 
groups in society have primacy over political party ideology. Another effect of the 
effectiveness of the regionally orientated lobby groups is that most legislative debates 
are addressed by their regional impact.( Kröger, M. 2012) 
Especially when resources related legislative acts are under discussion because of 
the underlying royalties question. Further fragmenting and complicating the picture is 
the autonomy of the federal states. Each state has its own legislature and 
administration. Regardless of party affiliation state governors tend to hold a strong 
influence over the Congress members from their state. Adding to this fragmentation of 
the federal executive is the influence independent civil society groups such as labor 
syndicates and socio-environmental movements and the well-established independent 
business class exert. ( Kröger, M. 2012) 
Although the Brazilian democracy is very fragmented, lobby groups have 
considerable power and the strong influence governors have over party members, 
none of the three powers is acting as a veto player considering policy formation. 
(Power, T. J. 2010) 
 
2. Is the executive a unitary actor or is it a coalition of parties or interest groups?  
Constrained by the separation of powers Brazilian presidents must obtain political 
support in a Congress with one of the highest levels of party fragmentation in the 
world. Additionally the control of party leaders over candidacies is restricted by an 
open list system which prevents them to exert influence over party members voting 
decisions within the Congress.  
  In these kinds of systems it is hard to discipline parties resulting in 
systematic resistance facing presidents trying to get their legislative proposals through 
Congress. However Figueiredo and Limongi show that this is not necessarily the case 
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in Brazil. According to them the extensive legislative powers of the president allow 
the executive both to control the legislative agenda and to restrict the legislature’s 
transformative power. Because the executive controls the resources upon which 
politicians depend for their political survival and internal rules organize the legislative 
work entirely around political parties, decision making is highly centralized and the 
president can affect a legislators capacity to pursue particularistic policies.  
(Figueiredo, A. C., & Limongi, F. 2000) 
In the 1990s it was attempted to dismantle this legacy and transfer deliberative 
power to civil society association and autonomous workers. Although councils and 
other participatory democratic institutions have been developed the neo-corporatist 
transformation of Brazilian society has been unsuccessful. Neo-liberal movements 
have weakened the position of the government and promoted company independence. 
This resulted in considerable political influence of the already powerful companies on 
political policy formation. (Kröger, M. 2012) 
On May 2011 president Roussef installed a new state corporatist institution. 
According to the director of Chamber Jorge Gerdau the goal of his Chamber of 
Management Policies, Performance and Competitiveness was to maintain good 
relations with the private sector without conflicts of interest and to optimize the 
performance of executive power in serving society, reducing costs and rationalizing 
processes and policies. But also this latest attempt to confine corporate influence on 
political decision making and bring executive power back to the government, gave 
Brazil’s biggest capitalists one more channel of direct access to state bureaucracies.In 
other words Brazil still shows clear signs of state corporatism. Consequently powerful 
capital rich enterprises still have considerable influence on executive policy formation 
and execution. (Kröger, M. 2012) 
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3. Do different parties/ factions control different institutions of government? 
The neoliberal privatizations of the 1990s created a context of fostering an 
independent association between foreign and national capital. This interdependence 
strengthened the power of state institutions in economic decision making. In contrary 
to the commonly held view that neo-liberalism diminishes state coordination of the 
economy the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s, “in reality helped to sow the ties of 
capitalism in Brazil. And created bases for its reinforcement in the subsequent 
government” (Kröger, M. 2012) 
However despite the fact that the fortification of the state corporatist system by 
neoliberal reforms during the 1990 might have resulted in an increase of state power 
the intentional government policies during this time led to an inversion of the 
hierarchy within the ruling classes. Neo-liberalism resulted in a shift of emphasis from 
the political to the economic realm, in favor of the interests of local family elites.  
(Kröger, M. 2012).   
According to Abu-El-Haj, this development led to the adoption of a neo-
mercantilist consensus among the most important politicians, industry groups, banks 
and economic think-tanks. These institutional arrangements, even after neoliberal 
privatization reforms gave big local capital preferential institutional access to the 
state, unifying the objectives of government and big capital so that it is hard to 
distinguish between them. (Abu-El-Haj, J. 2007). 
This alliance supported neo-mercantilist interests and by limiting the 
institutional access of trade unions, limited the influence of contentious actors 
criticizing investment policies. This political economic social class still exists in 
Brazil and keeps on accumulating power. Their high salary earning positions offer 
them privileged positions from which they can exert influence over the legislative and 
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legal process, the administration of the public machine, the hiring of large quantities 
of workforce or even in the formation of public opinion. 
“In the 1990s, 287 of Brazil’s 300 largest corporations were controlled by 
Families. The continuity of elite families and their networks is impressive’.35 After 
waves of corporate mergers in the past decade, the figure is even more 
concentrated.36 One percent of the population controls more wealth than the poorest 
50 per cent.37 Five thousand Brazilian families, 0.001 per cent of the population, 
control 40 per cent of the country’s GDP.3” (Kroger 2012 :892) 
 
Adding more weight to this structure in the oil sector, are Brazil’s strict regulations 
regarding local content. From the beginning of the liberalization one of the major 
criteria to evaluate bids one of the major criteria to counter foreign influence was that 
a majority share of the ownership of the oilfields should be in the hands of Brazilian 
companies. Over the years this local content clause has become more demanding and 
complex, including different specifications for onshore and offshore, the various water 
depths, and developmental stages. Given the dominance of the corporate families this 
meant a further enrichment of a small group of local elites. (Sennes, R. U., & Narciso, 
T. 2009)  
Although the leftist nature of Brazil’s current regime in combination with the 
nationalism of Brazils civil society considering resources, gives the executive some 
leeway in the exerting political influence over the oil sector in the sense that the 
directing board of Petrobras is appointed by the president. However the necessary 
sanctioning by the senate limits the executives autonomy in this regard.  
All the above has contributed in different ways to a complex institutional 
structure in the oil sector that resulted in unclear/overlapping jurisdictions of different 
levels of authority and of regulatory frameworks. Additionally, bureaucratic 
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inefficiency, lack of synergy among state agents at the various levels and the latent 
nationalistic pressure over resource regulations has resulted in a relative regulatory 
instability of the sector over which the 5000 Brazilian corporate families have 
considerable leverage. (Power, T. J. 2010).   
 
4. Do existing political procedures facilitate autonomous action by the executive 
leader? 
In general, presidentialist systems such as Brazil’s lack a built-in mechanism to induce 
cooperation between the executive and legislative branches of the government. 
Different constituencies and fixed mandates determine the behavior of the 
representatives and the president therefore the chances that the legislative and 
executive branch share the same agenda is small. The legislators political survival is 
not dependent on the success of the government hence representatives have few 
incentives to support the government. (Cason, J. W., & Power, T. J. 2009). 
Brazil seems to be a worst case example of the presidential system where the 
president, constrained by the separation of powers, must obtain political support in a 
Congress with high party fragmentation and an open list system prevents party leaders 
from exerting control over party members. Brazilian presidents however have had a 
considerable degree of success in enacting their legislative agenda’s. Decision making 
is highly centralized due to internal rules that organize legislative work entirely 
around political parties. The level of executive dominance over the legislation 
resembles that found in parliamentary regimes. This executive dominance is ensured 
by the range and extension of legislative powers held by the president. (Figueiredo, A. 
C., & Limongi, F. 2000) 
The leaders of the parties that belong to the presidential coalition cooperate 
with the executive because participation in the government provides parties with 
 65 
access to resources that individual legislators need for their political survival: policy 
influence and patronage. Party leaders exchange political support in the form of votes 
for policy influence and patronage. Backbenchers from parties who do not follow the 
party line are punished with sticks provided by the executive to the party leaders 
namely by denying them their share of patronage. Once the government is formed and 
benefits are distributed among the members of the coalition the president with the 
help of the party leaders, may threaten representatives and punish those who do not 
follow party line. Brazilian presidents govern essentially by agreeing to share 
executive power, for example by allocating different portfolio’s to other parties. 
(Cason, J. W., & Power, T. J. 2009). 
 
5. What are the prevailing norms of the conduct of foreign policy? Do they 
encourage executive/leader independence in foreign affairs or executive/ leader 
restraint? 
Another consequence of the neo-mercantilist state corporatist direction of Brazil is the 
increasing role of the presidency in foreign affairs. Prior to the neoliberal reforms of 
1994 presidents were highly dependent on the Ministry of External Relations (MRE) 
and accorded the ministry great autonomy in policy making. To the extent that when 
presidents were involved in diplomacy it was in the context of carefully stage-
managed summits and state visits where outcomes were generally pre-negotiated. This 
radically changed in the mid-1990s. (Cason, J. W., & Power, T. J. 2009) 
The neo-mercantilist development approach aimed at increasing the clout of 
the international political economy combined with level of executive dominance over 
the legislation resulted in a presidentialization of foreign policy. As a consequence 
Brazilian foreign policy has become much less consistent and “strategic”. As 
Brazilian presidents engage more directly in foreign affairs personal relationships 
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between Brazilian presidents and their counterparts have become much more 
important than they used to be. (Cason, J. W., & Power, T. J. 2009). 
These institutional arrangements indicate extensive decision making autonomy 
of the executive leader. However, as mentioned before because the unified objectives 
of the government and big capital after the neoliberal reforms of the Brazilian 
economy make it hard to distinguish between state and corporate interests, these 
autonomous decisions are significantly influenced by corporate interest. The 
considerable power of lobby groups, the control governors have over party members, 
the role cooperate interest plays in political decision making and the willingness of the 
president to discipline backbenchers that oppose the neo-mercantilist state corporatist 
direction shows that powerful capital rich family enterprises have a strong influence 
on the political procedures and thereby on the direction of the “autonomous actions” 
taken by the executive leader. (Power, T. J. 2010). 
 
Conclusion 
In the Brazilian case, Chinese economic statecraft signals, in the form of the proposed 
financing for the GASENE project and the development of the pre-salt reservoirs, 
resulted in critical attitudes of key societal groups towards the Chinese meddling with 
the domestic Brazilian oil sector. For the GASENE project the EXIM bank was 
replaced by the CDB, because the more commercial orientation of the latter resulted 
in less strict demands considering Chinese content. The loans were extended directly 
to Petrobras instead of the Brazilian government and the credits were used for the 
development of the pre salt reservoirs instead of general infrastructural developments 
executed by Chinese contractors, this decreased the leverage possibilities for China.  
When Brazil was in need of credit, for example for the GASENE pipeline and 
the development of the pre-salt reservoirs, the economic costs of the provision of the 
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credit on the Chinese oil for infrastructure conditions as in Angola, proved too high 
for Brazil’s key societal groups and would have resulted in considerable domestic 
political costs.  
Despite that existing political procedures facilitate considerable autonomous 
action by the executive leader, and that the prevailing norms of conduct of foreign 
policy encourage executive/leader independence in foreign affairs, the neo corporatist 
nature of the Brazilian state enforced by neo-liberal reforms in the 1990s, gives the 
5000 corporate families in Brazil a lot of influence on policy formation and execution. 
Compared to the Angolan situation where Sonangol is used by the leadership to keep 
politics under control in the Brazilian case business government relations seem to 
work the other way around. In Brazil the influence domestic corporate strategic and 
commercial interest have on politics results in non-cooption of Brazilian leadership 
with the economic statecraft signals. (Kröger, M. 2012). 
The third hypothesis isn’t applicable to the Brazilian case, Brazils executive 
power has significant levels of institutionally anchored decision making autonomy but 
this high level of stateness is not used to defy domestic opposition and make them 
comply to the signals because state leadership has different interests. Some authors 
see the CDB replacement of the EXIM bank on the GASENE project as an adoption 
of China’s economic statecraft to take the key societal groups in Brazil into account, 
following the key societal groups path. (Alves, A. C. 2013) However, Downs points 
out that the CDB decision to invest in the pre-salt reservoirs was primarily motivated 
by the prospects of high profits. Indicating a market dominated business first approach 
instead of a state controlled strategic political considerations. (Downs 2007)  
The oil for infrastructure deals in Angola were successful due to the 
compatibility of Angolan institutional conditions with China’s pathway of economic 
statecraft in Brazil they failed to produce satisfying results because the leaderships 
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pathway of economic statecraft is incompatible with the power distribution in Brazils 
society. Apparently the mirror imaging bias is still going strong amongst China’s 
leadership.    
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10. Domestic Chinese NOC- government conditions 
The last chapter of this thesis investigates the Chinese domestic level and test the 
fourth hypothesis, if there is an interaction effect between target states institutional 
conditions and the level of NOC autonomy. An important finding from chapters 7 and 
8 was that the leaderships pathway followed by China’s oil for infrastructure 
economic deals follow which is far more compatible with Angola’s then Brazil’s 
institutional framework.   
Efforts of Chinese NOC’s to pursue their interest in Angola and Brazil 
independent from China’s golden triangle, were in Brazil far more successful than in 
Angola. In Brazil the NOC’s have independently gained access to 791 million barrels 
from five different oil assets. In Angola however, joined efforts by Sinopec and 
CNOOC to acquire a 20 percent stake holding in block 32 operated by Total failed 
because Sonangol used its preferential right to block the transaction. (Alves, A. C. 
2011) 
 
Independently 
acquired NOC oil 
assets in Brazil 
Estimated reserves Estimated block production 
in barrels per day 
Net Share 
SINOCHEM 40% 
Block BM-C-7 
Pregrino Campos 
Basin (may 2010) 
300-600 million 100.000 40% 
(40.000 
bpd) 
REPSOL-Sinopec 
(oktober 2010) 10% 
albacora Leste 
(campos Basin) 
565 million 180.000 4% (7200 
bpd) 
37% BM-S7 pracuca 
(santos basin) 
550 million Still at exploration phase 14.8% 
25% BM-S-9 (Santos 
basin) 
1,1-2 billion 120,000 10% 
GALP-Sinopec 
(december 2011)  
10% BM-S-11/ Lula 
field (Santos Basin) 
8.3 bilion 100.000 3.3%  
(3300 bpd) 
Total share 791 million 50.500  
(Based on a table by Alves, A. C. 2011) 
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Using the independent oil acquisitions China’s NOCs in Brazil and Angola, I will 
access the 5 business government conditions that determining the level of NOC 
autonomy. 
 
Interest compatibility 
According to Alves Sinopec’s and CNOOC’s independent investments in Angola were 
the consequence of Sinopec’s unwillingness to cooperate with Sonangol in the 
construction of a refinery, the Sonoref refinery. Sinopec’s initial willingness to 
cooperate was a compromise to the Angolan government who linked the project to the 
concession of oil blocks. When Sinopec, CPNC, and CNOOC listed their subsidiaries 
on the New York and Hong Kong stock exchanges in 2001 they became exposed to  
the influence of other actors than the party state. (Downs 2009) When it became clear 
that the construction of the highly sophisticated refinery would have a small prospect 
of profit, Sinopec left the project. Sinopec’s unwillingness to incur financial loss for 
the purpose of consolidating political capital inflicted harm to the strategic energy 
security interest of the state. (Alves 2011)  
 Moriera points out that the incompatibility of state and NOC interest in Angola 
made Sinopec and CNOOC vulnerable to political risk: “the risk of a loss of a firm or 
an investor due to unforeseen momentous and/ or gradual changes in the “rules of the 
game” under which businesses/ investors operate.” (Moreira,S. 2013: 133)The 
Angolan political elite was unwilling to accept the changes to the Chinese investment 
model. The terms on which Sonangol engaged with the Chinese NOC ensured the 
cooption of key societal groups through Angola’s dual state structure, using the 
revenues to appease and suppress possible opposition. Independent acquisitions by 
Chinese NOC’s posed a possible threat to the elites who for their position are 
 71 
dependent on the dual state structure. The oil for loans deals of China’s golden 
triangle fit perfectly within this structure. (Moreira, S. 2013) 
By entering a joint venture with China Sonangol international (CSIH) Sinopec 
was brought back within this structure of personal friendships that controls Angolan 
politics and economics. Using the state to engage in these rentier structures was the 
only way for Sinopec to gain access to Angolan oil. In this sense the goals of the 
Chinese state and Sinopec are highly compatible. (Moreira, S. 2013)  
 
In Brazil the Chinese NOCs were quite successful in securing assets through mergers 
and acquisitions, although the net share of ownership of Chinese NOCs is far smaller 
than in Angola. The highest share of 14.8% in the BM-S-7 block in the Piracuca block 
is still in development and ownership in the other blocks is just a few percent. The 
block BM-C-7 in the Campos basin is the only block where a Chinese oil company 
has a significant share of 40%. This share is owned by Sinochem which although state 
controlled isn’t a NOC. Formerly owned directly by the Chinese government, 
Sinochem converted to a joint-stock company in 2009; it is now owned by the newly 
formed Sinochem Group (98%) and publicly traded Chinese shipping giant COSCO 
(2%) signaling Sinochem's transformation to a market-oriented company. 
(mercopress.com/2012/10/23)  
The fact that the only Chinese oil corporation that managed to acquire a 
significant share in a Brazilian oil fields isn’t a NOC combined with Petrobras dual 
rejection of the EXIM banks funding for both the 2
nd
 stage of the GESENE pipeline 
and the exploration of the pre-salt reservoirs, is a clear indication of Brazil’s corporate 
elites strategy to keep Chinese political influence and leverage to a minimum. That 
independent NOC’s acquisitions, following strategies guided by a market dominated 
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perception of FDI were far more successful then the state centralist efforts of China’s 
golden triangle, further strengthens this indication. (Xu, X. 2007 )  
Houser has observed that: “Although NOCs do occasionally make investments 
for political rather than economic reasons, business considerations rather than policy 
directives motivate the majority of their investments” (Houser, T. 2008). The NOC 
inability pursue commercial goals and acquire assets in Angola, independently from 
the government, resulted in their alignment along the governments lines. In the market 
dominated Brazilian institutional environment however, Chinese NOC are gladly and 
successfully venturing out on their own. In principle NOC commercial interests and 
the States strategic political interest are not always compatible. Brazils market 
dominated institutional environment brings this tension to the surface while Angola’s 
institutional conditions provides the Chinese government with effective tools to 
domesticate its NOCs. (Houser, T. 2008). 
  
Market structure  
Foreign companies involved in Angola operate under joint venture operations and 
production-sharing agreements (PSAs) with Sonangol. Chinese partners are Sinopec 
and CNOOC. Besides these Chinese companies, other dominant players on the 
Angolan market are Marathon, Petrobras, ExxonMobil, British Petroleum (BP), 
Statoil, Eni, and Total. Despite this large variety of players Angola market doesn’t 
qualify as highly fragmented due to the fact that all companies operating on Angolan 
territory have to agree to an alliance with Sonangol. Sonangol has a dominant 
presence in the sector and Angolan state control over the company ensures that allying 
with Sonangol does not provide leverage for the Chinese NOCs or the Chinese 
government on the Angolan administration. (Sennes, R. U., & Narciso, T. 2009). 
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The independent efforts of Sinopec and CNOOC to acquire the 20% stakes in 
block 32 in 2009 exemplify the way the concentrated market structure of Angola 
enables Sonangol to control the NOCs present on its territory. This ultra-deep water 
block was being relinquished by the American oil company Marathon. Besides 
sidelining the established Chinese business model, an important source of revenue 
used by the Angolan elite to keep up the dual state, Sinopecs and CNOOC competing 
bid with CNPCs offer also countered the interest of the Chinese government. (Alves, 
A.C. 2012). 
Competing NOC’s drive the price of the asset up and harm the overriding state 
interest at accessing exploration rights and at securing long term supply contracts for 
reasonable prices.(Liou, C. S. 2009) Sonangol’s exercise of its right of first refusal can 
be seen as a security externality resulting from China’s economic statecraft. In 2004 
Sonangol used its pre-emption rights to bypass Shell and jointly explore block 18 with 
Sinopec after it was granted a much needed loan by the EXIM bank, in 2009 the same 
preferential rights were used to block the bids by the renegade NOCs bypassing the 
government, state bank, NOC, golden triangle. Sonangol blocked the sale of a 20% 
stake in Block 32 to CNOOC, who tried to acquire this stake independently from the 
golden triangle. (www.china-briefing.com; Pereira, C., & de Castro Neves, J. A. 
2012). 
 Just like Angola, Brazil’s oil market is also dominated by a domestic NOC, 
Petrobras which accounts for 95% of Brazil’s national oil and gas production. Unlike 
Sonangol the Brazilian NOC has lost its monopoly over oil production and 
exploration with the constitutional change in 1997. Though many companies still 
chose to partner with it. Brazilian oil industry is characterized by a high degree of 
fragmentation. In 2009 the Agência Nacional do Petróleo, Gás Natural e 
Biocombustíveis (ANP) estimated that as many as 36 foreign companies were 
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involved in upstream activities in Brazil. In the highly fragmented markets China’s 
NOC’s only managed to acquire a small percentage of ownership over Brazils oil 
fields. Only the more commercial orientated Sinochem corporation got a 40% share in 
Block BM-C-7 in the Compos basin. (Silva, E.R. Soares, A 2011)   
Petrobras formally doesn’t have a monopoly but due to the neo-corporatist 
nature of Brazil’s economy it has maintained its dominance over the sector. Petrobras 
does enjoy significant bargaining power vis-a vis the government but as explained 
above, the oil for loan deals are a form of economic statecraft aimed at the leadership. 
Petrobras safeguards its commercial interest and the government and Petrobras 
together, are aware for too much foreign political leverage on Brazils oil sector. This 
has made independent market oriented Chinese NOC acquisitions far more successful 
than the attempts to access exploration rights through the politically founded oil for 
loan structure. The highly fragmented market and Brazil’s neo-corporatist state 
provide Petrobras and the government with an considerable buffer to resist Chinese 
economic statecraft. (Silva, E.R. Soares, A 2011)   
 
Nature of the reporting relation ship 
The nomenclature system, the system of hierarchically appointing personnel in control 
of the management of China’s institutions is the states primary instrument of control. 
Under this system managers must learn to balance corporate and party state interest. 
They are not only evaluated on their general performance but also on their 
commitment to the party state. “in other words the secret to success is to demonstrate 
managerial powers while not causing problems for the CCP.” (Downs, E.S. 2009) 
The investment approval system is a second form of control. Foreign energy 
investments in excess of US$30 million require approval of the National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC) and those in excess of US$200 million have to be 
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reviewed by the NDRC and then submitted to the State Council for approval. A third 
control mechanism, as mentioned above, are China’s state owned banks. (Gallagher, 
K. P., Koleski, K., & Irwin, A. 2012).  
In Angola the Chinese government interacts and NOCs are interacting 
intensively with national leaders, and Sonangol management dealing with Angola’s 
resource nationalism. The complete state control over Sonangol ensures state control 
over national resources and the resulting power from exclusive excess to the rents 
embedded in the oil is used to exert sovereignty over Angola. As long as Chinese 
business involvement suffices to the “mirror imaging bias”, that is concentrating on 
good relations with political elites whom reasoning from the Chinese perception of 
business government relations could protect and facilitate the deals, Angola is happy 
to engage with China’s golden triangle. (Oliveira, R. S. 2009).   
As came forth form the analysis of the market structure and the goal 
compatibility of the NOCs and the Chinese government, independent actions of 
commercial actors form a political risk for the Angolan leadership and consequently 
also for the golden triangles activities in Angola. Riding the wave started by EXIM 
Bank, the CIF credit line also managed to establish through a handful of well related 
individuals, a direct connection to the Presidency in Angola. CIF was funding 
significant infrastructure projects, three railway lines, a new airport, the Special 
Economic Zones, and mega housing projects. However most of these came to a halt in 
late 2007 due to unrealistic planning and major disbursement problems. CIF failed to 
complete all flagship infrastructure projects under its responsibility and honor its 
financial commitments, this raised some significant concerns among the Angolan 
political elite. This sequence of events had a negative impact on China’s image and 
interests in Angola. Despite the fact that CIF invested on the same conditions in 
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Angola as the EXIM bank, the lack of government control resulted in earlier 
mentioned problems. (Alves, A.C. 2012) 
In general however, the control of Angola’s leadership over Sonangol ensures 
control over the country and its oil wealth, and Chinese economic statecraft results in 
effective Chinese leverage on Angola’s leadership. Chinese economic statecraft has 
proven an exceptionally useful tool in the Angolan institutional environment. 
However the success of this formula is dependent on state control over the 
commercial actors. The close and intense corporation between Chinese banks, NOC,s 
government and Sonangol of the oil for loan deals, is impossible without a good 
reporting relationship between all the actors involved. (1.Burgos, S., & Ear, S. 2012). 
 
In Brazil the 2 x 20% shares of Sinopec in the blocks in the para-Maranhao field are 
acquired through the same structure as the majority of the assets in Angola. Chinese 
NOC have to start a joint venture or sign production sharing agreement to get access 
to Brazilian oil. The leverage acquired through the golden triangle ensures Beijing of 
a relatively good reporting relationship. Unlike Angolan situation however, where the 
complete submission of Sonangol ensures a good information flow, the neo-
corporatist nature of the Brazilian oil sector and the inverted leverage structure of 
Petrobras vis-à-vis the Brazilian government complicates the flow of information. 
More importantly because Brazilian leadership isn’t legitimizing its position using 
Petrobras as an instrument, it is far easier for NOC manager to demonstrate 
commercial managerial prowess while not causing problems for the CCP. (Downs, 
E.S. 2009)    
  The independently acquired Chinese assets in Brazil thwart the information 
flow based on good and intimate relationships with the target counties political elites. 
Stakes in these independently acquired fields enable NOC’s to let commercial 
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company interests get primacy over the strategic political interest of the government 
without the strict reporting obligation they face in the asset acquired through the loan 
for oil formula. In independent NOC acquisitions it is far easier for NOC managers to 
strike the deal and inform the NDRC and state council after the fact. According to 
Downs anecdotal information indicates that this often happens. (Eunsuk Hong and 
Laixiang Sun 2006; Downs2009; Liou, C. S. 2009) 
 
Unity of the state 
The three conditions described above, primarily concern the state centralism versus 
market domination paradox. A market dominated structure magnifies the difference 
between NOC commercial and governments strategic political interests. Although it 
was also pointed out that market dominated investment environment’s change the 
reporting relationship to the benefit of commercially oriented investment decisions. 
The next two conditions more specifically cover the state control versus NOC 
autonomy paradox 
Danreuther points out that Chinese oil companies are to a significant degree  
powerful and autonomous actors in their right even if there are formally owned by the 
state. This powerful position is due to a bureaucratic transformation of energy 
ministries into companies in the 1980 that set in motion a decline in state control. 
(Dannreuther, R. 2012)  
China’s NOCs have successfully prevented the emergence and empowerment 
of an independent energy ministry. The prevention of the rise of such an overarching 
strategic body has preserved their own access and influence on government policy 
making. The domestic energy bureaucracy is internally divided with considerable 
NOC influence nevertheless not isolated from government pressure and interest of the 
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state. NOC were able to influence decision making to advantage their own interest by 
lending employees to the understaffed energy bodies. (Danreuther 2012) 
Managers of NOCs have two roles; as party officials in the state sector and as 
CEO in commercial entities. There are two different government agencies analyzing 
their performance on two different criteria. Their political performance, or the way 
their company policy serves the central government’s policy, is judged by the National 
development and reform commission (NDRC) and their economic performance by the 
state-owned asset supervision (SASAC). Because the SACAC uses far more precise 
indicators compared to the NDRC policy guidelines measuring NOC managers on a 
political scale. SASAC’s annual economic performance evaluation is what motivates 
NOC managers. The vertical integration of the NOC’s combined with the way the 
bureaucracy is build up explains, according to Liou, the preference of NOC managers 
for economic logic over the political. (Liou, C. S. 2009) 
In the old mode of business operation under China’s planned economy 75% of 
Sinopecs crude was supplied either by its current domestic competitor CPNC, or by 
Sinopecs foreign counterparts. After the reform Sinopec and CPNC not only became 
domestic competitors, but also on the international level. The Chinese government 
deemed it necessary to reform the energy bureaucracy and introduce a certain degree 
of competition and push the NOCs into the market expecting that the competition and 
the Chinese oil market could be under its control. By devising a particular market 
structure and endowing Chinese NOC with monopoly power, the government has 
pinned its hope on them to help ensure and enhance China’s energy security. (Liou, C. 
S. 2009). 
Chinese NOC autonomy resulting from the bureaucratic fragmentation after 
the reform is key in explaining the pattern of NOC’s overseas expansion. In Brazil, 
CNPC and Petroleo Brasileiro SA signed a cooperative agreement in early 2005 to 
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jointly invest in the areas of oil refining, pipelines, and exploration and development 
putting CNPC in direct competition with Sinopec’s efforts to enter the Brazilian oil 
sector via the GASENE project. (www.ogj.com)  
Because the way each firm was organized under the planned economy 
Sinopec’s fanatic involvement with the GASENE project can be seen as a way to 
compensate for its disadvantage in operations in the upstream market, to reinforce its 
domestic market position vis-à-vis CNPC. But the GASENE project was also part of 
the Chinese government’s strategy to acquire access to the Brazilian oil market. 
Competition between NOCs is countering its strategic interests. Although Chinese 
NOCs are state firms responsible for carrying out national political goals, corporate 
autonomy resulting from restructuring empowers NOCs to resist the state’s political 
policies that conflict with their commercial goals. (Alves, A. C. 2011).   
The example of Sinopecs and CNOOC’s competing bids on block 32 in 2009 
shows that competing independently operating Chinese NOCs have a small change to 
result in favorable outcomes for the Angolese government because of the political risk 
they form for the elites in Angola’s highly centralized executive dominated 
institutional environment. (Moreira, S. 2013) Brazil however, has a more market 
dominated institutional environment where competing Chinese NOC might even 
provide certain economic advantages for the corporate key societal groups. (Liou, C. 
S. 2009). 
 
Resource endowments 
Multinationals from emerging countries are most likely to invest in developed 
countries or sophisticated technology, learning and compensation for their competitive 
disadvantages on the world marketed Chinese NOC are no example. (Jiang, W. 2009)  
Additionally the Chinese government has deemed it necessary to help nurture some 
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Chinese corporate giants to ultimate project China as a rising power. Chinese NOC 
have engaged in mergers and acquisitions by super oil giants like Exxon-Mobil, BP 
and Shell. Outward foreign direct investment enables Chinese firms to internalize the 
positive attributes of their investments. By investing abroad, Chinese firms gain 
access to non-natural resource related tangible assets such as intellectual property, 
design centers, managerial expertise, quality control systems, and marketing systems. 
(Jiang and Sinton 2011) 
Similar to how the NOC management was able to profit of the opportunities of 
the bureaucratic reformation due to their knowledge of the energy market, the 
acquirement and access to oil exploration specific high technology gives NOC a 
significant pool of knowledge which can be used to obtain a higher degree of 
autonomy. (Chen 2009)  
This development is strengthened by the fact that with the overseas expansion 
NOC are reassessing the kind of personnel needed for senior management post. The 
rising generation of senior managers differs substantially from their predecessors in 
their educational credentials. As the number of executives who have worked and 
studied abroad increases these companies are becoming more and more autonomous 
and exert their influence on the party-state because the skill they possess are in short 
supply in Chinese industry and government. (Downs, E.S. 2009)  
 In Angola the unequal division of the intellectual capital in the advantage of 
the NOC’s is balanced by the extensive amounts of financial and political capital the 
“traditional Chinese business model” provides to the government. The Chinese 
government is relatively better endowed with resources due to the personal 
relationships with the political leadership of the target country, sustained by the loan 
agreements of the Chinese state bank with the target government and enforced by 
intergovernmental treaties.  
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In Brazil on the other hand, most of the NOC’s oil assets are independently 
acquired and the institutional conditions of Brazil’s oil industry stimulate autonomous 
NOC action giving the government less access to the resources NOCs acquired 
through mergers and acquisitions. The fact that NOC managers often strike the deal 
and inform the NDRC and state council later shows that Brazil’s institutional 
environment encourages autonomous business decision-making. That the CDB in the 
credit extension to Brazil lets commercial motivations get primacy over political 
strategy seems to indicate that there is a spillover of autonomous decision making to 
other Chinese state owned companies.  
 
Chapter conclusion 
As shown in Chapters 8 and 9 target state institutional conditions in Angola and Brazil 
have a high impact on the success or failure of economic statecraft because it has a 
profound influence on the extent to which Chinese involvement in the target country 
is characterized by state centralism or market domination. The main finding of this 
chapter is that the fourth hypothesis is partially true, target states institutions do 
strongly influence the level of corporate decision making autonomy of Chinese NOCs 
versus their government. Chinese NOCs in Brazil are considerably more autonomous 
than in Angola.   
The different market structures of Angola and Brazil brought to light that NOC 
commercial interest and the states strategic interest are principally incompatible. The 
Brazilian corporate elites, aware of Golden triangles attempts to gain leverage on the 
oil sector obstructed the oil for infrastructure deals. However, China’s NOC are 
allowed to enter the oil sector independently in a more market dominated setting. This 
makes that Chinese oil companies in Brazil enjoy a larger degree of autonomy than in  
the government controlled Angolan setting.   
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The high leverage of the Chinese government on the Angolan government and 
thereby Sonangol ensures Beijing of a good flow of information. In contrast the neo-
corporatist nature of Brazil’s institutional framework severely limits the flow of 
information. China’s bureaucratic fragmentation is less of a problem in Angola’s 
highly centralized executive dominated institutional environment because NOCs that 
deviate from the “traditional Chinese business model” are brought back in line by the 
Angolan elite. The Brazilian institutional situation enables NOC managers to fully 
exploit the bureaucratic fragmentation, chasing their commercial goals. Conclusively, 
the relative resource endowments of NOCs Brazil is way better than in Angola, where 
the financial and political capital of the Chinese state disarms the intellectual, 
managerial and technical capital of the NOCs. 
However, in as we have seen in Chapter 7 the it is not only the level of 
executive decision making autonomy that determines the relative power position of 
the Chinese government versus the target government. Both Brazil and Angola 
possess considerable levels of executive decision making autonomy. China’s 
economic statecraft failed in Brazil because the leaderships pathway that was 
followed isn’t compatible with Brazils institutional environment.   
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11. Conclusion  
The central question of this thesis is: Under what conditions does the Chinese state 
succeed or fail to control, direct or otherwise use national oil companies in pursuit of 
its strategic goals? Two possible explanatory frameworks emerged from the literature. 
The first has an international focus and explains success or failure of economic 
statecraft from the perspective of a target states susceptibility to it, which is 
determined by its institutional conditions. The second framework has a Chinese 
domestic focus and supposes that the ability of the sending government to incentivize 
its commercial actors to behave in line with its strategic interest is dependent on 
sending state domestic business government conditions. 
In line with Putnam’s two level game theory I investigated both the Chinese 
domestic as the international level, using a comparative case study on Brazil and 
Angola, two countries with highly different institutional frameworks. I tested four 
hypotheses:  
1. Chinese economic statecraft strategies are aimed at security externalities that 
establish structures of economic interdependence between China and the target 
country. 
2. China’s oil for infrastructure deals follows the leaderships pathway of 
economic statecraft.  
3. Chinese oil for infrastructure deals in Angola were successful because the high 
level of executive decision making autonomy enabled Angolan leadership to 
resist domestic opposition and due to its insufficient level of decision making 
autonomy the deals failed in Brazil. 
4. There is an interaction effect between the target states institutions and the level 
of autonomy Chinese NOC enjoy versus their government. Weak target state 
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institutional environments strengthen China’s relative power position versus 
the target county resulting in a larger ability to control its NOCs, strong target 
state institutional frameworks weaken the relative power position of China and 
thereby increases NOC autonomous decision making ability  
 
The first hypothesis, tested the methods and goals of China’s economic statecraft,  
I have shown that both in Angola and Brazil China’s economic statecraft is aimed at 
the interest transformation security externality target. The method by which this  
interest transformation is to take place is by establishing interdependence between its 
own and the target countries economic system. An important instrument China has 
used to achieve this are the so-called oil for infrastructure deals, where loans are 
extended to the target country, for infrastructural improvements to be repaid, with oil 
as collateral.    
The second hypothesis, is the first hypothesis zooming in on the target states 
institutional conditions. Using Blanchard and Ripsman’s framework I have shown that 
there are two pathways of economic statecraft, a key societal groups pathway and a 
leaderships pathway. Institutional conditions determine the success or failure. When 
economic statecraft follows the key domestic groups pathway, key domestic groups 
are co-opted by the economic benefits of the senders signals of economic statecraft 
and push for policy change. High levels of executive decision making autonomy 
enables state leaders to resist the calls and defy the sender. When economic statecraft 
convinces target state leaders that they ought to comply with the senders demands 
high levels of executive decision making autonomy help them to overcome domestic 
opposition to compromise. China’s oil for infrastructure deals follow the leaderships 
pathway of economic statecraft.  
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Considering the third hypothesis can be said that, in Angola the Chinese 
government was highly successful incentivizing its NOCs to produce security 
externalities in line with its strategic interests. Angolan institutional conditions 
deterred the NOCs from autonomous expeditions and if they tried close ties between 
the Angolan and Chinese government resulted in a swift domestication of the NOC 
who dared to deviate from the line of the government.  
The failure in Brazil however, was not due to a lack of executive decision 
making autonomy but because the leaderships pathway of economic statecraft China’s 
oil for infrastructure deals follow is incompatible with Brazils institutional conditions. 
Brazilian state leadership was not co-opted by Chinese economic statecraft due to 
opposition of the powerful neo-corporatist societal business elites. Chinese NOCs 
were allowed on the Brazilian oil market but not through the Chinese state centralist 
oil for infrastructure constructions. The main oil equity Chinese NOCs acquired in 
Brazil was accessed independently from the government and its main instrument of 
Chinese economic statecraft, the EXIM bank.      
With respect to the fourth and final hypothesis can be said, that there indeed is 
an interaction effect. However, the level of autonomy NOCs enjoy versus their 
government, is in the cases I investigated, not to be accredited to the strength of their 
institutional environments. Or at least not when using the level of executive decision 
making autonomy as institutional indicator.  
Both Angola and Brazil have significant levels of executive decision making 
autonomy but in Brazil Chinese NOCs enjoy a high degree of autonomy from the 
Chinese state and in Angola the relationship is characterized by a high degree of state 
control. After accessing Angola and Brazil using Blanchard and Ripsman’s framework 
it became clear that the relative power position of China versus the target state has 
more to do with the pathway of economic statecraft followed.  
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The discussion on the level of executive decision making autonomy and how the 
Chinese government and NOC’s handled the cooption of key societal groups in the 
target country falls within the state centralism versus market domination paradox. 
In Angola, the golden triangle loans for oil structure did not only mean plentiful 
and relative cheap financing but Beings support also entailed a significant political 
risk management tool. The Angolan case fitted perfectly with the Chinese customarily 
buildup of personal relationships of mutual trust and obligation with political elites, 
whom the Chinese believed could protect and facilitate deals by themselves. Just like 
the communist party and government leaders have undisputed control over major 
decisions that affect China’s oil and gas industry, Sonangol is under complete control 
of the Angolan state.  
In this state controlled environment NOC acquisition efforts independent from 
the Golden triangle formed a potential political risk for the Angolan elite. For the 
Chinese government independent NOC acquisitions entailed a undesirable shift to 
NOC autonomy. Sonangol’s exercise of its right of first refusal when Marathon Oil 
Corp tried to sell a block to CNOOC, can be seen as a security externality. The golden 
triangles oil for infrastructure deals were a more preferable scenario for Angola’s elite 
thus Sonangol’s exercised its right of first refusal, domesticating the CNOOC that 
defied the established rules of engagement.   
 
China’s relative material power position is the greatest in state centralist situations. 
China is experienced in navigating through complex patron-client relationships, 
handing out personal and institutional favors and dealing with opaque political 
constrains. In accordance with its “mirror imaging bias” China concentrates on good 
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relations with political elites whom in their perception of business protect and 
facilitate the deals.  
China’s economic statecraft was far less effective in Brazil because China refuses 
to deviate from the leaderships pathway. In Brazil, the golden triangles non-coercive 
economic incentives of the oil for infrastructure deals are perceived as potentially 
highly costly, by Brazils corporate elite who resent Chinese leverage on the oil sector. 
The economic costs of the conditionality’s of EXIM banks oil for loan structure 
proved too much risks and the more commercial interest rates of the CDB were 
chosen over the conditionality’s of the EXIM bank deal.  
The target state institutional conditions also impact the level of NOC autonomy, 
and the extent to which the Chinese government is able to control or direct NOC 
behavior. Analysis of the five domestic business government conditions showed that 
NOCs enjoy a far greater level of autonomy versus the Chinese government, in the 
market dominated Brazilian environment than in the government controlled Angolan 
setting. 
The ability of the Chinese government incentivize its NOCs to engage in 
economic interaction that produces security externalities that are in line with its 
strategic goals is far greater in “state centralist” Angola then in “market dominated” 
Brazil. Apparently the mirror imaging bias has created a certain path dependency 
concerning China’s economic statecraft. However China’s successful restructuring of 
the energy bureaucracy made not only made NOCs more competitive on world 
markets, the other side coin is that the interest of commercially orientated NOCs are 
not always compatible with the states state centralized execution of its energy grand 
strategy.  
Following the leaderships pathway of economic statecraft in Brazil’s market 
dominated institutional environment diminishes the opportunities of Chinese 
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government to incentivize its NOCs to produce security externalities that are in line 
with its strategic interests. In It might be hard, if not impossible for state Centralist 
China to change direction and follow a domestic groups pathway, without giving up 
government control and giving in to market domination. And it is questionable if 
China would pursue this pathway of economic statecraft while at the moment, it is 
already struggling to keep its increasingly commercially motivated NOCs under 
control.  
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